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Executive Summary 
This thesis is about the conceptual frameworks and models that we use to understand 
human performance in technical work situations. It represents both theoretical and empirical 
approaches to the issue of how we can conceptualize the human operator as a controller 
embedded in an environment with technical applications. The thesis starts with an 
experimental test of ergonomics recommendations (Article I) that many designers use to 
design control input devices in technical interfaces (e.g. Kroemer & Grandjean, 1997). The 
article shows, by using measures of goal-directed use (rather than static tasks), that the 
adherence to ergonomics recommendations may not necessarily entail good or optimal 
performance. This also means that the models we use to design for human performance must 
take into account the dynamic nature of the task performance, rather than static factors of that 
work performance.  
The thesis then continues with a phenomenologically inspired conceptualization of the 
human mind as an embodied agent aimed towards controlling actions in the world (Article II). 
This view is then implicitly brought on into observations of high-speed craft navigation and 
manoeuvring, where the human operator’s control strategies are investigated (Article III). The 
last article (Article IV) is a direct continuation of the observations of high-speed craft 
operation and presents video recordings from conversations during navigational exercises. 
The article discusses the use of the control situation framework to model the operator’s 
models. The adaptation of expert operators is accountable to an ecological affinity which 
reflects perception-action based experience with the manoeuvring of the high-speed craft in 
question.  
 Taken together, these articles show a time-line of the building up of a dynamic model 
of the human controller that is embedded in a world consisting of ever-increasing technical 
complexity. The focus in the articles in this thesis (except for Article IV) is primarily on the 
operators and the understanding of the operators’ perspective as a situated agent that is 
immersed in the unfolding co-agency of technology, environment and humans. The operator’s 
understanding and conceptualization of the given situations that unfold in technically 
mediated work are of critical importance when it comes to understanding how one should 
model the operator. The problem lies in apprehending the operator’s experience as it affects, 
and are affected by, the dynamic work flow of the joint cognitive system. The overarching 
aspect these articles point to the need to model the human operator as both separated and 
integrated part of the technical system.  
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Sammendrag 
Denne avhandlingen omhandler de konseptuelle rammeverk og modeller som vi 
bruker for å forstå menneskelig arbeidsprestasjon i en teknisk kontekst. Den representerer 
både teoretiske og empiriske tilnærminger til hvordan vi kan konseptualisere den 
menneskelige operatøren som en kontrollør som er omgitt av et miljø med tekniske systemer. 
Avhandlingen starter med en eksperimentell test av ergonomiske anbefalinger (Artikkel I) 
som mange designere bruker for å utforme tekniske grensesnitt (f.eks. Kroemer & Grandjean, 
1997). Artikkelen viser gjennom å teste målorienterte handlinger (heller enn statiske 
oppgaver) at design i henhold til de ergonomiske standardene ikke nødvendigvis medfører en 
optimal prestasjon. Dette betyr at de modellene vi bruker for å designe for menneskelig 
prestasjon må ta høyde for arbeidsoppgavens dynamiske natur, heller en å fokusere på statiske 
elementer ved arbeidsoppgaven.  
 Avhandlingen fortsetter så med en fenomenologisk inspirert konseptualisering av 
menneskesinnet som en kroppsliggjort agent som søker å kontrollere handlinger i verden 
(Artikkel II). Dette perspektivet er så anvendt i observasjoner av navigasjon og manuvrering 
med hurtigbåt, hvor man studerte den menneskelige operatørens kontrollstrategier (Artikkel 
III). Den siste artikkelen (Artikkel IV) er en direkte kontinuasjon av observasjonen fra 
hurtigbåtnavigasjon og presenterer videoopptak av samtaler mellom navigasjonspersonnel 
under navigasjonsøvelser. Artikkelen diskuterer bruken av kontrollsituasjonsrammeverket for 
å modellere de modeller operatøren bruker for å kunne kontrollere båtens bevegelser. 
Tilpasningen gjort av erfarne operatører kan beskrives som en økologisk affinitet som 
reflekterer persepsjons-handlingsbasert erfaring med å manuvrere hurtigbåten. 
 Sett under ett så viser disse artiklene en tidslinje for etablering av en dynamisk modell 
av den menneskelige kontrolløren som er omgitt av et miljø som består av økende teknisk 
kompleksitet. Fokuset i artiklene i denne avhandlingen (unntatt artikkel I) er primært på 
operatøren og på forståelsen av operatøres perspektiv som en situert agent omgitt av et miljø 
hvor interaksjonen mellom teknologi, miljø og mennesker sammen utgjør grunnlaget for å 
kontrollere en artbeidsprosess. Operatørens forståelse og konseptualisering av en gitt situasjon 
som utvikler seg i en teknisk mediert arbeid er av stor viktighet for å forstå hvordan man skal 
modellere operatøren. Utfordringen ligger i å forstå hvordan operatørens opplevelse påvirker, 
— og blir påvirket av, den dynamiske utviklingen av menneske-maskinsystemet. Det 
overordnede aspektet artiklene i denne avhandlingen peker ut er nødvendigheten av å 
modellere den menneskelige operatøren som både en separat og en inkludert del av det 
tekniske systemet.  
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Preface 
This thesis is the result of fruitful collaboration with several knowledgeable 
researchers who I had the pleasure of working with. The thesis consists of four articles and an 
introductory chapter that describes the relation between the articles and the possible 
theoretical and methodological implications when the four articles are seen as a whole.  
The introductory chapter outlines briefly the theoretical basis for the modelling of 
human-technology systems. Special emphasis is given to the relation between modelling the 
operator as such, and modelling the whole sociotechnical system.  
Article I presents an experimental study of the effect of ergonomics recommendations 
for the design of control knobs on operator performance. The article was written in 
collaboration with three co-authors. I was in charge of all aspects of the research process 
(planning, literature review prior to the experiment, data collection, data analysis and primary 
writing). The experimental equipment and the graphical user interfaces programmed in flash 
was designed and assembled by the third author (H. V. Bjelland).  
Article II presents a philosophical and theoretical approach to the understanding of the 
human operator as an active, extended controller of activity. The main focus is on how the 
human operator’s ability to control movement is altered by technical transport systems. The 
article was written in collaboration with two co-authors. I was involved in all aspects of the 
research process and was responsible for the literature research prior to the writing, the 
writing of the article and the theoretical contents.  
Article III presents observations of high-speed craft navigation in confined waters. The 
article elaborates on and extends Petersen’s (2004) control situations framework to include 
the operator’s control strategies. The article was written in collaboration with three co-
authors. My contribution was related to participating in data collection and as a secondary 
writer. I am jointly responsible for the theoretical content together with C. A. Bjørkli who was 
the primary writer. Data analysis was done by C. A. Bjørkli. 
Article IV presents transcriptions of communication on the bridge of a high-speed 
craft during navigation and manoeuvring in difficult and critical situations. The article was 
written in collaboration with two co-authors. I was directly involved in all aspects of the 
research process (conceptualization of research, data collection, data analysis, theoretical 
content and primary writing). 
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Introduction 
Research on human-technology systems has for decades acknowledged the importance 
of modelling the characteristics of the users of technical systems (e.g. Card, Moran & Newell, 
1983). The reason for this is the realization that technical systems must not only design for the 
physical characteristics of human operators, but also the user’s cognitive characteristics 
(Norman, 2002; Vicente, 2004). The models of the users are dependent upon the contents of 
the work process that is modelled. This means that some models are more appropriate for 
describing a given set of phenomena than other models (Woods, & Hollnagel, 2006). The 
models used by researchers guide their observations and conceptualization of work situations 
(Hollnagel, & Woods, 2005, p. 50). The underlying conceptualizations and the derived 
models are important because the models can guide the design of technical systems (Woods, 
1998). The design of work domains have serious consequences for the work performed by 
human operators in sociotechnical systems (Perrow, 1999; Casey, 1998). In general, one can 
differentiate between two types of scientific models of human-technology systems – the 
componential and the systemic. These models address different aspects of the human-
technology system, and thus also give different solutions to the practical problems of human 
factors research.  
 
The componential view of human-technology systems  
The first general type of models is the componential models of human-technology 
systems. They assume that the behaviour of a system1 is principally predictable from the 
behaviour of its components (Card, Moran & Newell, 1983; but see Hollnagel & Woods, 
1983/1999; Dekker, 2005). Hence, by knowing the behaviour of each individual component, 
it is possible to determine the behaviour of the whole system. This leads to an approximation 
of the whole system’s behaviour based on the notion of human operators plus technical 
system plus interface characteristics. Thus, the whole system’s behaviour is understood as a 
simple additive interpolation of the components’ behaviours. 
The componential view has often been used in the modelling of elementary cognitive 
processes (see e.g. Townsend & Ashby, 1983; Fodor, 1983). The ontological basis for this 
view is most prominently present in the information processing approach to human cognition 
                                                 
1A system does not have any default size, but is defined by the boundaries the modeller sets and the components 
that are included within the system. This means that a ‘system’ can include any research object and the parts of 
its surroundings. For example, human working memory may be seen as a system that interacts with an 
environment, or one may view a human as a system which interacts with its environment, or one may see the 
human-environment as a system in its own right (see e.g. Gibson, 1979). 
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and behaviour (Gardner, 1985; Fodor, 1983). The information processing approach is a 
componential approach that is based on a dualism between mind and body, body and 
environment, and mind and environment. It had (and to some extent still have) the hegemony 
in psychological research for several decades (Gardner, 1985). The basic argument for 
maintaining the dualism between mind and body was based in the assumption that the world 
was ‘under-specified’ or ‘impoverished’ which meant that the sensory input stemming from 
the environment was not enough to signify an object, but rather that the interpretation of the 
sensory input had to be supported by the use of internal representations (Marr, 1982). Since 
the information-processing theorists believed that sensory input had to be supported by 
internal representations, the structure and layout of the environment had little or no relevance 
for human behaviour since the behaviour was essentially guided by internal representations 
(Hoff, 2004). Thus, the environment (and hence also technical systems) is removed from the 
analysis of human cognition (see Gardner, 1985, for a historical note). This understanding 
leads to a view of technical systems as neutral, detached objects, which are independent of the 
results of the human operator’s behaviour. The technical system becomes a passive instrument 
for use, and is not viewed an active partner in the interactive process (Ihde, 2002; Dekker, 
2005). 
The separation between the environment and the human operator can be seen in 
several of the information processing models used to specify human behaviour and interaction 
with computers. Specific models of human functioning involve the description of 
(hypothetical) internal information processing. This internal information processor is divided 
into different modules corresponding to the different subsystems of internal information 
processing (the perceptual system, the motor system and the cognitive system) where each of 
the stages have their own memories and processors2 (e.g. Card, Moran & Newell, 1983). 
These information-processing models involve the description of constraints on, as well as the 
work performed by each of the subcomponents (mostly response times and information 
processing capacities; Townsend & Ashby, 1983). The general output of the system can then 
be estimated by adding up the calculations performed by each of the subcomponents (Card et 
al., 1983; see also Hamilton & Clarke, 2005 for a recent use of this type of modelling). The 
environment is only seen as interesting to the degree that it gives sensory input to the 
                                                 
2 Note that the terms ’processors’, ’information processing’ and ‘modules’ involve an analogy to computers and 
the way computers work.  
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information processing modules (Hoff, 2004)3. This means that faulty decisions or actions can 
be attributed to internal processing mistakes in the encoding, storage or retrieval of relevant 
information (see e.g. Reason, 1990, p. 12, and, Reisberg, 2001, p. 204ff, for a thorough 
description) and not to the layout of the environment.  
The dualistic perspective on the relation between human cognition, the body, and the 
environment has also formed the theoretical and ontological basis for the understanding of 
human-technology systems (Hollnagel & Woods, 2005). The dualistic ontology implies that 
humans and environment (machines) are both physically and functionally separate. Following 
these assumptions, system errors then becomes a question of man or machine. This 
perspective is explicitly formulated in the approach to accident investigations that has been 
termed “the old view of human error” (Dekker, 2002, p. vii; see also Dekker, 2005). The “old 
view” approach implicitly assumes that the human component can explain system mishaps 
according to the formula: Human error = f(1 – technical failure). This leads to the proposal 
that if there is no technical malfunctioning that can adequately explain the mishap (e.g. 
technical failure = 0) then the conclusion must be that human error was the cause of the 
accident (Dekker, 2005). Thus, if one accepts the premises for the componential view, it is 
principally possible to understand the joint functioning of humans and machines as a product 
of ‘human plus machine’ (as can be seen in the additive models in Card et al., 1983). 
Degraded system performance can therefore be understood as being caused by poor 
performance in either the human or the technical component.  
However, the growing complexity of current technical systems have given indications 
that the relationship between humans and technology now have become so intricate that the 
componential view is no longer a good model of human-technology systems4. A sole focus on 
the behaviour of a system’s components does not help in the understanding of the historical 
and systemic contributions to performance in complex sociotechnical systems (Dekker, 2002, 
2004; Perrow, 1999). This realization has pointed to an extension and reformulation of the 
unit of analysis in human-technology systems leading to a systemic view of human-
technology systems (Hollnagel, & Woods, 1983/1999).  
 
 
                                                 
3 The end of the 1980-ies saw a decline of explicit internal information processing models and rather turned 
towards the relation between the human and the technical system (see. Reason, 1990, p. 26ff, for a summary of 
such models). 
4 Information processing models are not bad models as such. These models only work better on other levels of 
analysis, such as predicting human performance in constrained or experimental tasks (e.g. the expected reaction 
times to train signals; Hamilton & Clarke, 2005; Øvergård, Bjørklund, & Hoff, 2006). 
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The systemic view of human-technology systems  
The systemic approach to human-technology interaction was termed Cognitive 
Systems Engineering (CSE) by Hollnagel and Woods in 1983 (Hollnagel & Woods, 
1983/1999). This research paradigm began as a reaction to the componential perspective 
which categorized humans and technical systems as separate components that are assumed to 
work according to mechanistic properties (Hollnagel, & Woods, 1983/1999). It is a general 
agreement that complex sociotechnical systems can be said to consist of mainly three 
components: Humans, technology (including interfaces) and environment (Bridger, 2003; 
Hollnagel & Woods, 2005). Even though the components of a system can be described as 
separate object (as nouns – a human, a machine and an environment) it does not entail that 
the components are ontologically or functionally separate when it comes to the goal-directed 
work practises that underlie system performance. The goal-directed activity effectively joints 
the physically separate components into one functional unit (Hollnagel & Woods, 2005). 
When observing real-life sociotechnical work domains it is clear that the complex 
developmental trajectories that contribute to the sociotechnical system’s performance cannot 
be separated into human, technical or environmental aspects. 
This has led to a focus on the functional unity of sociotechnical systems meaning that 
the unit of analysis is the goal-directed adaptation of the whole system, which involves the 
coordination of activity across the system’s components (Hollnagel, & Woods, 2005; Vicente, 
1999). The unit of analysis is enlarged to involve not only the behaviour of individual 
components, but to cover the co-creation and coordination of activity across humans, 
technology and environment – it becomes a Joint Cognitive System (JCS) (Hollnagel & 
Woods, 1983/1999, 2005). This means that the technical system is no longer seen as a neutral 
object but as an active contributor to the JCS output. Hence, we must analyse and model 
human-machine systems as a functional unit, and not as separated and isolated components 
(Dowell & Long, 1998). 
The whole system’s outcome is seen as an emergent process, where each part 
contributes to the final process, but no single component is causally connected with the 
outcome of the whole system (Vicente, 1990; Hollnagel, 2001; Hollnagel & woods, 2005). 
Control in human-machine systems is not an aspect of either of the system’s parts, but is an 
emergent product of the coordination of work across the systems components (Hollnagel, 
2001). This notion of emergence comes from studies in systems science that show that the 
whole is larger than the sum of its parts and that the whole follow a different set of rules than 
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those that guide the behaviour of components (Strogatz, 2003; Winfree, 2001; Kelso, 1995; 
Beek, Turvey, & Schmidt, 1992; Hollnagel & Woods, 2005).  
Based on these basic assumptions, the models of human operators has developed from 
operator internal cognition (micro-cognition) to descriptions of the contextually guided 
adaptations the operator carries out to control the JCS’ outcome (macro-cognition) 
(Hollnagel, & Woods, 2005; Hollnagel, 2006). The functional perspective of CSE also entails 
that the human operator is seen as an integrated part of the joint system. This change in focus 
means that the human operator is not given any particular privileges in the systems 
perspective since system performance is seen as an emergent process (Vicente, 1990). 
However, one has attempted to create macro-cognitive contextualized model the human 
operator to better understand the orderliness of human action.  
Macro-cognitive models attempt to show how human performance can be explained 
by reference to contextual characteristics. These models are dynamic and contextualized in 
the sense that they attempt to show how a set of possible systemic consequences may arise 
from a given set of probable causes (Hollnagel, 1993), rather than attempting to make point-
to-point estimations of human performance. These human performance models have shown 
how human control maintenance occurs on several control levels and time-scales 
simultaneously (e.g. the Extended Control Model; Hollnagel & Woods, 2005, p. 149ff). That 
the level of control an operator engages in is dependent upon the time available to perform 
control actions (e.g. the Contextual Control Model; Hollnagel, 1993; Hollnagel, & Woods, 
2005), and that shifts in the operator’s control level depend on the number of successful or 
failed actions performed on higher or lower control levels (Hollnagel, 1993). These models 
can predict the occurrence of categorical shifts in human control maintenance by showing 
how the operator’s behaviour is dependent upon contextual and task-related characteristics. 
The human operator is in essence modelled as an adaptive and context sensitive controller 
who is an integrated part of the JCS.  
The systemic perspective is according to Vicente (1990) particularly relevant for the 
investigation of correspondence-driven systems. Correspondence-driven systems are systems 
that are guided by external dynamic and goal-relevant constraints. In these types of systems 
the important task for the cognitive systems engineer is to find a way to present information to 
the user about the system’s state so that the user can form a veridical understanding of the 
system (Vicente & Rasmussen, 1990).  
However, as noted by Bjørkli (2007), this assumption is somewhat problematic. In 
situations where operators face unfamiliar or uncertain conditions for work, the operators’ 
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performance becomes dependent upon reflection and understanding of the system’s 
characteristics and not necessarily on the actual state of the system (Bjørkli, 2007). The 
presence of uncertainty is a vital characteristic of complex socio-technical systems (Vicente, 
1999; Norros, 2004) and it is particularly so for transport systems (Burns & Hajdukiewicz, 
2004; Bjørkli, 2007; Røed, 2007). This indicates that the operator’s work in open, 
correspondence-driven systems, with large degrees of uncertainty, is dependent on both the 
operator’s understanding of the system and of the representations of system states. 
The implications of this insight is that it is one thing to model how the whole system 
achieves control, but it is an entirely different matter to model how the human operator 
achieves and maintains control over a process with uncertain dynamics. In other words, it is a 
difference between modelling the operator as an integrated part of the whole system and 
modelling the operator as a controller. Thus, it might be necessary to take an intermediate 
position between the modelling of internal characteristics of the human operators on one side, 
and the modelling of the JCS on the other.  
 
An Intermediate position between ‘operator-centred’ and ‘system-centred’ modelling 
It has been shown that the systemic approach have enabled an understanding of 
performance in human-technology systems that was not attainable using the componential 
approach (Dekker, 2002, 2004; Woods & Hollnagel, 2006). But, as mentioned above, the 
focus on the whole system performance where the operator is just an integrated part can be 
somewhat problematic. The problem becomes explicit when we observe the maintenance of 
control of open correspondence-driven systems affected by large amounts of uncertainty in 
system dynamics.  
Uncertainty in the reception and production of variability. Uncertainty in 
correspondence-driven systems occurs when the effector systems’ ability to bring about 
changes in system states are conditioned by contextual variance. An effector is a component 
of a system that responds to operator input and brings about changes in system states. In these 
systems it is a problem for the operator to know how control actions will affect system states 
(Petersen & Nielsen, 2001). This means that there is a form of discrepancy between the 
consequences the operator intended, and the action and the actual consequences of that action.  
This differentiation between action and consequences have been thoroughly described 
by von Wright's (1971, p. 66ff) differentiation between doing and bringing about. This 
conceptual division is related to the difference between actions and consequences of action. 
The implications of this conceptualization for the understanding of effector systems in 
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sociotechnical systems have been described by Petersen (2004; Petersen & Nielsen, 2001). 
‘Doing’ refers to the actions of a human operator who acts on the technical system in order to 
reach a given system state (Petersen, 2004). ‘Bringing about’ refers to the combination of an 
action and other events which contributes to the production of the consequence. This means 
that the consequences of all actions (whether human or technical) are conditional on the 
presence of other factors (von Wright, 1971).  
Take the example of a car moving forwards at a speed of 50 km/h. If the driver starts 
to turn the steering wheel in a clockwise direction the car will steer towards the right. 
However, the action of turning the steering wheel clockwise is not in a determinate 
relationship to the car’s rightward movement. It relies on a number of other factors that are 
conditional for this action to have this particular effect. For instance, the friction between the 
front wheels and the road surface must be above a given level, and the steering wheel must be 
connected to the front wheels. The principle is the same in all situations ― any action must 
have a set of other conditions that allow that action to have a particular consequence (von 
Wright, 1971).  
This principle becomes non-trivial when used to understand the operator’s situation in 
correspondence-driven systems with a high degree of contextual variation. The consequences 
are great when the conditions that help actions ‘bring about’ intended consequences are not 
perceivable or at best uncertain (Bjørkli, 2007; Petersen, & Nielsen, 2001). The uncertain 
effect of the effector systems means that contextual variation not only creates unpredictable 
contextual variation, but also that the joint system’s ability to handle these problems is 
uncertain.  
This means that there is very difficult to help the operator produce a veridical model of 
the system, as expressed as a goal for cognitive systems engineers by Vicente and Rasmussen 
(1990). It is difficult because the actualization of the movement is not given in advance, but is 
an ongoing developmental trajectory that has different expressions depending on initial states, 
the operators’ strategies and the physical forces that enable changes in the technical system’s 
state. Since both sides of the ‘equation’ involving the level of disturbances and the ability to 
handle those disturbances are, at best, uncertain, the operator cannot be guided by contextual 
information alone (Bjørkli, 2007). This means that we must be able to model the ways that the 
operator handles this uncertainty. We must in other words describe the operator’s 
understanding of the situation in an action-based format, and not in a system-state format. 
Thus, it might be a need to model the human-technology system as both a JCS and from the 
perspective of the operator.  
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A further problem for those who endorse either the systems view or the operator view 
is the way that the operator’s actions are mediated by the technical system. Technical 
mediation refers to the way the technical system effectuates the operator’s actions upon the 
controlled process.  
The technical mediation of operator action. Human action is increasingly being 
subjected to a technical mediation, where the relation between actions and consequences are 
no longer directly mediated as it is in unaided human activity (Hoff, 2004; Øvergård & Hoff, 
2005). The technical extension of the human perception or action ranges entails that humans 
can perform new sets of tasks more efficiently than was possible without the technical aid 
(Hancock & Chignell, 1995). However, this extension is not only positive, as the extension of 
human capabilities also entails that the technical component narrow down the number of 
possible ways actions can be performed. That is, technology alters the way that one can 
perform a task. The technical mediation also alters or removes parts of the experiences of 
performing an action (Heidegger, 1977; Ingold, 2000). This can lead to an experiential gap 
between operator actions and the consequences of these actions (Ihde, 2002; Øvergård & 
Hoff, 2005). The experiential gap that stems from technical mediation between human action 
and the consequences of these actions have relevance for the modelling of control 
maintenance in complex sociotechnical systems.  
Hollnagel and Woods (2005) have talked about two different ways that an interface 
works when it connects a human operator with the controlled process. The first is where the 
operator interface allows the operator to work directly on the controlled process. This 
embodiment-relation, as termed by Hollnagel and Woods’ (2005), exist when there is a tight 
coupling between the operator and the interface, often to such a degree that the operator acts 
through the interface, rather than acting on it to perform some task. The interface can be said 
to allow the operator a ‘direct’ but mediated view of the controlled process. In the second 
relation ― termed the hermeneutic relation (ibid), the interface acts as an interpretative 
device which informs the operator about the state of the controlled process via the use of 
representations. The operator cannot use the interface to observe the controlled process, but 
must act on the basis of information that is translated by the technical system. This means that 
the operator must act on the technical interface in order to affect the controlled process.  
Thus, on one hand there is the former categorisation of the relation between interface 
and operator where the interface acts as a facilitator for the operator’s smooth unhindered 
coping with the controlled process (Wheeler, 2005). On the other hand, there is the latter 
categorisation where the technical system gives technically translated information regarding 
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the controlled process, but not allowing direct access to the controlled process. The interface 
thereby acts as a barrier to the smooth coping with the controlled process (ibid, Lützhöft, 
2004). In this sense, we may understand the use of technical systems as a form of elaborate 
tool-use (Bjørkli, 2007). 
However, the relation between operator and technical system does not always conform 
to these two types of categorizations. Technical systems and tools can shift from being things 
we can act through to obstacles to the operator’s goal-directed activity. In other words, if the 
goal-directed performance is the analytical unit, one may find that the analytical unit relate to 
the human-technology system at one time, and to the operator at other times. This fluent 
nature of human-technology interaction can be described by the phenomenological 
observation that during skilled tool use, we do not perceive the tool as an independent object 
in the world, but rather as a something we experience the world through. In these situations 
the thinghood of the object recedes and the object becomes an extension of the user’s body 
(see e.g. Merleau-Ponty, 1962, pp. 165ff). However, if the technical system for some reason 
does not work as planned, the interface retains its character as an ‘object-in-the-world’ that 
hinders smooth task performance (Lützhöft, 2004; Wheeler, 2005). The interface can in other 
words change character from being something the operator acts through to becoming a barrier 
for further activity. This change also alters the user’s experience of the interface from being a 
medium for activity, to becoming an obstacle for the smooth coping (Hoff et al., 2002a, 
2002b; Hoff, 2004).  
This means that the JCS can in some situations become disjoint. This would happen in 
particular cases where the operators can no longer use technical system to intentionally alter 
system states. An example of this situation is given in Clark and Graybiel (1955; as cited in 
Holly and McCollum, 1996, p. 461).  
 
The pilot took a waveoff as he attempted to land the helicopter on a spot 
lighted probably by four flashlights. Because of the extreme denseness of 
the fog he was unable to find the spot. As he circled to attempt a second 
landing apparently he became completely disoriented. While he was in a 
vertiginous state, he circled to the right but thought he was turning to 
the left. Although he was on instruments, he does not remember altitude 
or airspeed. As he crashed he stated he became a passenger and rode it 
in. 
 
When the operator can not make any control actions that alter system states the system 
is no longer a joint cognitive system, but becomes an uncontrolled technical system and a 
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helpless human operator. Then there is no joint cognitive system. This means that a model of 
the human-technology system should be able to model this transition or shift in system 
boundaries.  
The modes of the technical mediation of the operator’s action and the dual uncertainty 
of the actual contextual variance and the ability to handle this variance means that the 
operator some times must be understood on his own terms, since the situation may be 
perceptually underspecified or because the operator cannot understand the representations on 
the interface. The technical mediation of operator action and the presence of uncertainty 
regarding both the contextual disturbances that must be met, and the abilities the joint system 
will have to handle these problems are particularly present in the use of transport systems 
(Bjørkli, 2007; Burns & Hajdukiewicz, 2004; Petersen & Nielsen, 2001; Petersen, 2004).  
 
Transport systems as Joint Cognitive Systems 
The latest decades have seen an increase in the implementation of complex technology 
in the transport sector, thus increasing the complexity of the work domain. Thus, modern 
transport systems can be described as highly complex JCS which operates under a wide set of 
operational instructions, in highly variable contexts, and must meet several tasks at the same 
time (Burns & Hajdukiewicz, 2004). Modern transport systems fulfil all criteria that define 
complex sociotechnical systems5 (see Vicente, 1999, p. 15ff). They have large problem 
spaces (Burns, & Hajdukiewicz, 2004) and they involve many human controllers who often 
have different cultural or educational background or are geographically distributed (Hutchins, 
1995). There is a high degree of potential hazard related to the operation of transport systems 
(Perrow, 1998; Dekker, 2005), and many transport systems tend to have highly automated 
functions (Lützhöft, 2004; Sarter & Woods, 1995, 1997). Furthermore, transport systems are 
the archetype of dynamic systems that work in uncertain environments where contextual 
disturbances are the norm (e.g. Norros, 2004; Burns & Hajdukiewicz, 2004; Bjørkli, 2007).  
The majority of human factors research have focussed on work in stationary process 
control plants, such as nuclear industry (Hollnagel & Woods, 1983/1999), process control 
(Vicente, 1999) or hospitals (Woods, & Hollnagel, 2006). The unfolding dynamics that must 
be controlled in stationary systems are connected to the physical characteristics of the 
controlled process. They can be described as more or less coherence-driven, closed systems 
which mean that the systems do not have external factors that affect the controlled process 
                                                 
5 Complex sociotechnical systems are a substitutable term for JSC. 
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(Vicente, 1990). Transport systems, on the other hand, are the archetype of open, 
correspondence-driven systems. Transport systems can also be said to be a special type of 
correspondence-driven systems, since they not only are subjected to contextual variance, but 
they also move around in the context of their operation, thereby leaving its own movement as 
the process to be controlled (Petersen & Nielsen, 2001; Bjørkli, 2007). This means that 
transport systems are not only exposed to contextual variability, but that the movement itself 
affects the contextual variability. For example, a car driving on a road is not only affected by 
the friction of the road, the visibility, or the presence of objects, but it can also alter it’s 
relation to these objects by altering the way it moves on the road. By choosing driving speed 
the driver affects the available time to perform control actions and the friction needed to 
perform a turn without skidding (Fuller, 2000).  
Contextual variation leads to a high degree of uncertainty regarding the ability to 
produce and control the movement of the JCS (Petersen, & Nielsen, 2001). The contextual 
variability does not only affect the external disturbances that the transport system must 
handle, but it also affects the ability to meet these disturbances (Petersen, 2004; Petersen & 
Nielsen, 2001). This means that transport systems engender challenges to efficient production 
that are different from what we find in towards stationary JCS (Burns & Hajdukiewicz, 2004, 
Bjørkli, 2007).  
Furthermore, transport systems allow for a particular mediation of human activity. It 
not only allows for movement in new context, butt the activity itself alters the position and 
perspective the operator has. This coupling of transport system movement and self-movement 
entails that the operators in many situations extends their perception of action possibilities to 
also include their vehicle. This is supported by experimental evidence that indicate that 
experienced drivers of a wide range of vehicles in some way extends the perception of 
passable apertures to also cover the vehicle that they control (see Shaw, Flascher & Kadar, 
1995, for a theoretical and empirical review). This close connection between experienced 
operator’s and their work domains has been empirically noted before, particularly in 
supervisory process control (metal manufacturing industry; Norros, 2004) In this sense, the 
transport systems form a functional and experiential unit with the operator. A movement of 
the steering wheel of the car not only affects the car’s movements but also the driver’s 
movement. In this sense is movement with transport systems just a different mode of making 
self-movements. The vehicle becomes something the operator uses to produce self-movement; 
hence the relation between the vehicle and operator becomes a type of embodiment-relation 
(see Hollnagel & Woods, 2005, for a description of the embodiment-relation). The 
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experiential mode of interacting with the technical systems is believed to affect human work 
with technical systems (Hoff et al., 2002a, 2002b; Hoff & Øvergård, In press).  
Because the controlled process in transport systems are dependent upon the physical 
forces that act upon the technical effector systems, they are inherently dependent upon 
contextual variation to perform their tasks. This dependency upon the interaction between the 
technical system and the variable environmental state means that the capability of bringing 
about changes in movement is highly dependent upon environmental factors.  
This uncertainty of the capability of bringing about system changes is particularly 
descriptive of marine transport systems (Petersen, 2004; Petersen, & Nielsen, 2001). This 
gives rise to new sets of problems that must be addressed by human factors researchers. The 
question becomes how an operator handles the uncertainty in the ability to effectively meet 
disturbances. When the effect of control actions is not predicable in advance it must in some 
way be tackled by an adaptive feedback controller (whether human or technical). To 
understand how these events affect performance, we must understand how the operator deals 
with this uncertainty. This means that the observations of transport systems might be a 
possible field of investigation where one might observe the dual nature of human-technology 
systems where operator’s acts both as an integrated system, but where uncertainty and the 
mediation of action also entail that the operator some times must be modelled as a distinct 
part of the system.  
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Research focus 
This thesis takes as its starting point the challenge of understanding the basis for 
human operators’ goal directed interaction with technical systems (all articles). It questions 
how technical systems and design recommendations set the premises for human goal-directed 
activity (Article I & II) and does so particularly by focussing on how humans achieve and 
maintain control over moving JCS (Article II, III & IV).  
The thesis involves a re-framing of human interaction with technical systems. The 
thesis starts out with a test of how different interface designs affect human performance in an 
experimentally constrained but goal-directed task (Article I). It then moves on to presenting a 
theoretical reframing of the nature of human interaction with the environment, and describes 
three phenomenological aspects that are of particular importance when it comes to describing 
the experiential aspects of human control over technically aided movement (Article II). The 
last two articles seek to broaden the conceptual understanding of military High-Speed Crafts 
in confined waters. The focus in these two articles is on the control strategies and models used 
by the navigators (Article III & IV).  
The works presented in the thesis have attempted to maintain a close connection 
between the models that we use to interpret human behaviour, the work domains we observe 
operators’ performance, and the actual interpretation and modelling of that performance.  
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Methods 
I have kept the articles in the same chronological order as they were written. This has 
been done so to present the historical development of this research project. Concepts and 
terms used differ somewhat between the articles. This discrepancy has been deliberately kept 
intact in order to show the conceptual and theoretical development during the project.  
This thesis combines several methods and approaches to the understanding of the 
relationship between the human operator and technical work domains. The choice of a 
combination of different approaches is based on the arguments of Vicente (1997), i.e. that 
human factors researchers should triangulate between highly controlled laboratory 
experiments, less controlled experiments, simulator-based experiments and real-world 
qualitative investigations of the phenomenon in question. Each of these levels of scientific 
investigation involves different methods as the methods one use must be adapted to the 
research object. Experimental (article I), theoretical and philosophical (article II) and 
observational studies using video camera and interviews (articles III and IV) are included in 
this thesis.  
The first article presents first a highly controlled laboratory experiment (article I) 
which investigates the effect of ergonomics recommendations for interface design on human 
performance. The method and related problems is thoroughly described in the article. The 
second article presents a triangulation of theoretical and philosophical arguments based upon 
empirical approach to how one can conceptualize the human operator as an extended 
controller of action. The other empirical articles (article III and IV) present the use of video 
camera to record incidents and conversations during the real-life high-speed navigation and 
manoeuvring. The observations and transcriptions were validated through agreement between 
the authors of the articles.  
All the included works have had the aim to increase the understanding of the effect of 
technical work domains and of constructed environments (both simulated and real) on the 
human operator. These approaches have followed the same underlying conceptual framework, 
- namely that of cognitive systems engineering. However, the individual scientific works have 
not focussed on any particular methods as the highly complex and multidimensional nature of 
human work and performance in complex technical environments need a wide set of 
approaches to be fully understood (Vicente, 1997). Each research object has been approached 
in the way that seemingly could best answer the problem at hand. 
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Articles Included in This Thesis 
 
 
Article I 
Øvergård, K. I., Fostervold, K. I., Bjelland, H. V., & Hoff, T. (2007). Knobology in use: An 
experimental evaluation of ergonomics recommendations. Ergonomics, 50(5), 694-705. 
 
The aim of the article was to test a set of ergonomics recommendations to see how 
operator performance was affected by interfaces that either followed or did not follow 
ergonomics recommendations presented in a well-used ergonomics textbook (Kroemer & 
Grandjean, 1997). Ergonomics standards may be viewed as a set of models of a population of 
users. These standards (Department of Defence, 1999) and textbook recommendations 
(Kroemer & Grandjean, 1997; Pheasant, & Haslegrave, 2006) works as a basis for interface 
design. The standards are described in such a way that it does not account for environmental 
or task variance or cognitive differences among operators. Ergonomics standards such as the 
military standards in the American military (Department of Defence, 1999) or the ergonomics 
recommendations given in various textbooks (e.g. Kroemer & Grandjean, 1997; Pheasant & 
Haslegrave, 2006) can be seen as examples of static standards or design norms. We 
investigated the importance of ergonomics standards for human performance in an 
experimental task involving goal-oriented action. 
The results indicate that performance is not univocally better when interface design 
conformed to the ergonomics recommendations as opposed when the interface design was not 
according to the ergonomics recommendations. The results of this article imply that even 
simple and experimentally constrained goal-directed tasks are dependable on several sets of 
constraints related to the task, the operator, and the relation between these constraints. 
Additionally, the results indicate that tasks used to test motor memory (within the 
information-processing approach; Wilberg & Adam, 1985) were affected by a wider set of 
constraints than those acknowledged by information processing theory (Magill, 1982; 
Goodman, 1985; see Article II; Øvergård et al., 2007, p. 703 for the specific argument). In 
effect these results indicate a need for a dynamic model for human performance that 
acknowledges the different levels of constraint present in interaction between operator and 
interfaces. 
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 Article II 
Øvergård, K. I., Bjørkli, C. A., & Hoff, T. (2008). The bodily basis of control in technically 
aided movement. In S. Bergmann, T. Hoff and T. Sager (Eds.), Spaces of Mobility (pp. 101-
123). London, UK: Equinox Publishing.  
 
 The article describes an explicit theoretical and philosophical basis for the 
understanding of human operators who work with technical systems. The article starts out 
with pointing out the increased use of technically aided movement in the world. The use of 
technical systems for mobility purposes greatly increases efficiency but it also leads to 
accidents and pollution which causes numerous injuries and deaths each year. Reports have 
argued that human error could account for as much as 90 percent of these accidents. However, 
these reports are built on the assumption that humans and technical systems are physically and 
functionally separate in relation to the outcome of the joint human-technology system’s 
behaviour. This means that humans are blamed for accidents as long as the technical 
component has worked properly (Dekker, 2002, 2004). In this view, the technical system 
becomes a neutral physical object which people use purposefully.  
 However, this 'neutral' view of technical systems is problematic as it has been shown 
that the mere availability of information and action possibilities are not enough, but this 
information must also be perceivable by the human operator (Woods, et al., 2002). Thus, we 
must acknowledge that technical systems should be designed by focussing on observers-
dependent measures, as opposed to objective observer-independent measures (Flach, 1995). 
The article proceeds with this perspective in mind and further draws upon the embodied mind 
approach which posits that human interaction with the environment are fundamentally based 
upon a reciprocal coordination between human minds, bodies and environments (Clark, 
1997). Movement and action then becomes ontologically prior to cognition because the 
perceptions and actions founds the basis for any categorization (Ihde, 1983). This 
understanding supplants the componential view of humans and technology with an embodied-
mind paradigm (Clark, 1997) that acknowledge the interdependency between humans and the 
environments (and technical systems).  
 The article presents three phenomenological characteristics, derived from empirical 
and philosophical research, which arguably describe human use of technical systems and 
tools. These arguments show that human interaction with natural or technical environments is 
based upon goal-directed perception-action cycles. The change from unaided bodily 
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movement to technically aided movement leads to an extension of human cognition and action 
capabilities (named extension of the body) into and through the technical system. Technical 
systems in essence mediate human action. This technical extension or mediation often 
exceeds the action capabilities for the unaided human body, and thus shifts the constraints for 
possible action into the relation between technology and environment, rather than between 
humans and the environment (Øvergård & Hoff, 2005). The shift in constraints of the 
controlled process creates a possible experiential gap between the actions performed by the 
human and the consequences of these actions (Hoff et al., 2002a, 2002b).  
With these phenomenological characteristics of human interaction and use of technical 
systems in mind, the article then turns to asking how technical transport systems affects the 
human ability to control the movement with the vehicle. The problem of technical over-
extension of human bodily perception-action capabilities is a possible source of alienating the 
human operator to the process s/he is supposed to control. These aspects points to the need for 
a time-dependent and interaction-based approach to human-technology interaction that can 
account for the fluent, dynamic relationship between the operator and the technical system.  
 
 
Article III  
Bjørkli, C. A., Øvergård, K. I., Røed, B. K., & Hoff, T. (2007). Control situations in high-
speed craft operation. Cognition, Technology, and Work, 9, 67-80. 
 
 The article investigated the control strategies that military navigators used when 
manoeuvring high-speed crafts in confined waters. It was based upon the conceptual 
framework called the ‘control situation framework’ presented by Petersen (2004). This 
framework posits that control maintenance can be generically described as the relation 
between the control possibilities, and the control requirements. Earlier approaches have 
generally evaluated performance according to system states and how this state is in relation to 
system goals. However, Petersen makes the argument that the performance of context 
sensitive systems faced with dynamic situations and uncertainty cannot be evaluated from the 
specification of systems states. It must rather be evaluated according to how the control 
situation is affected by the change in control possibilities or control requirements because the 
ability of effector systems to bring about changes in system states is dependent on contextual 
circumstances (Petersen & Nielsen, 2001; von Wright, 1971). Transport systems are known 
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for the dependency on contextual variance (Burns & Hajdukiewicz, 2004), and this 
differentiates transport systems from other stationary supervisory systems (Bjørkli, 2007).  
  Marine navigators are continually faced with the necessity to balance demands for 
safety and efficiency. The demands are made concrete by organizational demands for fast 
movement and the need to maintain the functional integrity of the vessel by avoiding 
collisions with objects and rocks during the navigation. The navigators achieve the goals of 
efficient navigation by sailing as fast as possible (often at top speeds), while they achieve safe 
navigation by either stopping (reducing speed) or steering away from dangers. Thus the 
navigators are faced with two primary ways of controlling the vessel’s movement, either by 
controlling speed or through the control of heading. These control actions jointly affects the 
present and future control possibilities and control demands at any given time.  
 The article observed how navigators chose to balance these demands and possibilities 
for control during manoeuvring in confined waters. The balancing between the demands and 
possibilities of the situation was observed in situations where the navigators chose a trajectory 
that went closer to the nearby dangers (e.g. sunken rocks) than necessary, but that enables 
easier handling of future actions. This reflects a strategy of control optimization by pushing 
the borders for safe manoeuvring by not maximizing distance to dangers, but rather to exploit 
the available space to improve the ship’s future position. This strategy can be compared by a 
situation where the navigator idealizes control at all times by maintaining the maximal 
distance to near-by dangers. This control idealization can be compared with Gibson and 
Crooks’ (1938) notion of “Field of safe travel”. In a static system-state perspective is this way 
of controlling the vessel superior to the optimization-strategy since it at any point in time have 
a larger distance from dangers. But when seen in a dynamical time-dependent view, the 
optimalization strategy is superior; because it takes into account both the vessel’s movement 
dynamics and upcoming dangers. Further, the navigators can alter the balance between 
control possibilities and control demands through setting the speed for a particular region, -
thereby specifying the range of demand and possibilities that exist in a given region.  
The findings indicated that in addition to acknowledging the unfolding interaction 
between control possibilities and control requirements one should also focus on the control 
strategies the navigator used to maintain acceptable control. 
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Article IV 
Øvergård, K. I., Bjørkli, C. A., & Hoff, T. (In review). Models and Control Strategies used by 
Experienced Marine Navigators. Cognition, Technology, and Work. 
 
 This article further extends the control situation framework by testing how this 
framework could be used to describe the model's the operators had of the controlled system. 
Any dynamical model of a human-technology systems should be able to describe “the models 
the users may have” (Hollnagel, 1993, p. 377), meaning that it should reflect an authentic 
phenomenological description of operator's perspective. This description must involve an 
operator-dependent model of the system and the environment that can account for the real-life 
adaptations an operator makes. The reported data was taken from two series of events.  
The first (the, 'Kjøtta incident') involves observations of the adaptations performed by 
the navigational crew in order to re-establish knowledge of their actual position. Lack of exact 
position was a problem for the crew because the ship was bounded into a narrow straight that 
contained several sunken rocks. The visibility was poor due to night-time and occasional 
snow and rain showers. Hence, the navigator had to navigate using only beacons because 
perches and landmarks were not visible in the darkness. The beacon was not seen at the 
expected time, thus indicating that the crew did not have an exact estimation of the ship’s 
position. The crew made several adaptations of the ship's movement capabilities to meet 
control requirements that were uncertain due to the lack of an exact knowledge of the ship's 
position. The navigator first lowered the speed to relieve time pressure, secondly he increased 
the gain on the ship's rudder control so large rudder angle changes could be made quickly on 
demand.  
The second series of events (the 'Indre Folda reflections') involve transcriptions of 
verbal reflections on four occasions between the commanding officer (CO) and the navigator 
aimed at improving manoeuvring in confined areas. The reflections were related to the 
planning and optimization of passage narrow passages, and to strategies for making small 
changes in heading during manoeuvring in narrow passages. Manoeuvring with marine 
vessels involve uncertainty due to the influence of contextual disturbances on the ability to 
bring about changes in system states (Petersen, 2004). This means that the operators must 
adapt not only to the contextual disturbances, but also to the uncertainty of being able to adapt 
to the control requirements.  
The results from the two sets of observations relate to the adaptations made in 
response to the uncertainty of both control requirements and control possibilities. The results 
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across all observed conditions indicated that the operators adapted to uncertain situations by 
increasing the control possibilities and reducing the control requirement related to future 
adaptations on short time-scales. Further, effective control demands that operators take into 
consideration the specific expression of the ship's turning capabilities. The data indicated that 
the operators adapted exactly in order to meet these physical constraints.  
The strategies of preparing the joint system for control actions made on short time 
scales can be understood as a function of the navigators’ model of the situation and the 
situation in itself: Firstly, high speed craft manoeuvring is first and foremost guided by the 
constraints set by the immediate environment. The environmental constraints also directly 
affect the time constraints that navigators have to perform control actions. Secondly, the 
capability of the craft’s effector systems to bring about system state changes is conditional 
upon other contextual factors such as wind, currents and waves. These contextual factors are 
not readily perceived by the human operator and thus create uncertainty of the actual 
capability of the craft’s effector systems (Petersen, 2004). By reducing the need to make 
quick adaptations on shorter time scales the operators give themselves more time to deal with 
unanticipated changes in the craft’s movement dynamics. 
The results indicate that the concepts of control possibilities and control requirements 
reflect basic aspects of the navigators’ control strategies and models of the work domain. The 
observations of the navigating crew’s strategies and verbalizations during the Kjøtta incident 
indicated that they explicitly balanced control possibilities up against control requirements. 
The reflections at Indre Folda also indicated that these strategies were guided by an explicit 
knowledge of the how the physical and temporal dynamics were actualized in manoeuvring. 
This means that navigators’ model is rather based on the functional expression of the 
interaction between hydrodynamics and effector systems, rather than being a formalized 
specification of the characteristics of the effector systems as such. 
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Reflections 
The modelling of human-technology systems have gone through the increase in the 
analytic unit from single components that interact to more systemic approaches involving the 
co-agency between operators, technology and environment (Hollnagel & Woods, 2005). The 
increase in the analytic unit has allowed us to see connections in human-technology system 
performance that was not visible before (Dekker, 2005). 
Hollnagel and Woods (2005, p. 49) states that “ ... the purpose of science is to produce 
valid, scientific knowledge about a particular domain or problem area”. This thesis adheres 
to that understanding of science. It has both investigated (Articles II – IV), and tested 
(Articles I, III & IV) ways of modelling the human operator’s interaction or co-agency with 
technical systems.  
I would claim that this thesis has at least two possible implications for the modelling 
of the human operator. The first implication is the possibility of modelling the human operator 
as an extended controller. The second implications is that one should consider to model the 
human operator both as a separate and as an integrated part of the system, rather than only 
modelling the human operator as a part of a larger system. The following sections discuss 
these to implications in more detail. 
The human operator is an extended controller. The articles (III & IV) have expanded 
the control situation framework to cover not only the formal description of the control 
possibilities and control requirements for a given system (Petersen, 2004), but suggest that 
this way of describing operator control maintenance in uncertain environments also should 
include descriptions of the operator’s control strategies (Article III). Furthermore, it has also 
been shown how the control situation framework can also be used to describe the operator’s 
models of the work domain (Article IV). The operator’s models are based upon an 
understanding of the functional expression of the interaction between the ship’s effector 
systems (rudder, propellers and hull) and hydrodynamics. Together with fact that navigators 
can estimate a ship’s future position, this understanding of the operator’s models indicate that 
marine navigators are oriented towards dynamic change rather than the passive maintenance 
of system states. This points an important argument in the control situation framework, 
namely that both control possibilities and control requirements are based upon an active sense 
of controlling. Control possibilities relate to what the operator can do, i.e. what effective 
actions that are available for altering system states. Similarly, control requirements refer to 
what must be done to maintain the human-technology system within acceptable operational 
boundaries (Petersen, 2004; Article III). The perspective is based upon understanding the 
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activity as it unfolds, rather than static estimations of the transition between discrete system 
states. The active understanding of the human operator’s control maintenance resonate with 
the second article (Article II) that points to a bodily and cognitive extension of the human 
mind (or operator). The joint goal-directed activity unites humans and technical systems (see 
e.g. Maravita et al., 2002; Berti & Frasinetti, 2000; Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p. 165). The human 
operator becomes not just an operator of a technical system, but an extended controller of that 
system, which must internalize the systems dynamics or extend and adapt the perception-
action cycles to include the system’s physical boundaries (see e.g. Shaw et al., 1995, for a 
theoretical review of the extension of perception and action).  
Modelling the operator as both separated and integrated with the technical system The 
second implication of this thesis is that marine navigators extend their perception-action 
cycles to cover the transport system’s functional and physical boundaries. Combined with the 
observation of the operators control strategies as used in uncertain situations, there is reason 
to ask whether the operators should be modelled on its own right, rather than being modelled 
simply as an integrated part of the whole system.  
The integration of the user in the technical system leads to a methodological challenge 
by creating a situation where an intentional component becomes a part of a larger system that 
can be said to have intentions and goal of its own. According to the systems approach to 
human-technology systems, the human operator is only a part of the system, and is not given 
particular importance on its own (Vicente, 1990). However, as presented in Article III and IV 
the human controller in marine navigation is surrounded by uncertainty arising from 
contextual disturbances, and uncertainty concerning the ability to bring about changes in 
system states. This brings forth the challenge of making models that show how the human 
operator is both an intentional component and a part of the larger system. To describe this 
duality (but not dualism) of human-technology systems, we need to articulate the basis for this 
dual nature of human-technology co-agency. One way of analyzing context-bound 
phenomena or open systems has been described by Jaan Valsiner as inclusive separation: 
 
The second way to separate a phenomenon from its context is by 
inclusive separation: The target is differentiated from its context, 
but the context is retained in the subsequent analysis because it is 
considered to be interdependent with the phenomenon. Although 
the emphasis in research is on the object phenomenon, the 
relevance of the context is recognized in the investigation.  
(Valsiner, 1997, p. 24, Italics in original).   
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This way of analyzing the human operator means that we can describe the human 
operator in a way that still maintains the individuality of the operator while also showing how 
the operator is integrated within the larger system. This approach would be a middle course 
between “OPERATOR-only” models, which describe the operator as a de-contextualized 
closed system and “SYSTEM-only” models, which describe the output of the whole system 
while ignoring the behaviour of the system’s components.  
This argument of creating an understanding (or model) that shows the inclusive 
separation of the operator is strengthened by the fact that the borders between a system and an 
operator can be fluent. If the analytical unit is aimed at the intentional goal-directed 
behaviour, then the unit may at some points in time relate to the human-technology system 
and at other times at only the human operator. This fluent nature of human-technology 
interaction can be described by the phenomenological observation that during tool use we do 
not perceive the tool as an independent object in the world, but rather as extensions of our 
bodies or minds (Clark, 1997, 2003, 2005). This extension of the human operator, which 
happens both with tools (Maravita et al., 2002; Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p. 165; ) and transport 
systems (Shaw, et al., 1995) would be difficult to model and understand in the systemic 
approach, where the operator is ‘merely’ a part of the system. It has been proposed that 
cognitive systems engineers should attempt to design for the establishment of the embodiment 
relation (Hollnagel & Woods, 2005). Other researchers have gone further and argued that the 
mediation of action and the embodiment of tools and technology should be a research focus 
with the aim of producing technical systems that are easier to use (Clark, 2003; Hirose, 2002).  
I find, at least in relation to the work domains observed in this thesis, that there is a 
firm theoretical and empirical basis to question whether one should model the relation 
between the operator and the technical system on its own. My approach to this problem is that 
we should not model the human operator as integrated into the physical system as such, but 
rather that we should allow for the models of the human operators to be integrated with the 
models of the technical system. We must in other words be able to separate the operator’s 
personal perspective from the objective ‘birds-eye-view’ of the whole system.  
At first glance this might seem like a tall order. However, I believe that the activity-
based framework for understanding the operator already simplifies the integration of operator 
models with system models.  By viewing the operator as an extended controller that 
temporarily can transcend the boundaries between body, technology and environment, we 
have already implicitly said that the human operator is not only the operator’s cognition and 
body, but that the operator is extended both cognitively (Clark, 1997, 2005) and bodily 
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(Maravita et al., 2002; Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p. 165; Hirose, 2002) into the surrounding 
technical or natural environment. This means that the model of the operator must involve 
these objects that extend the operator’s ability to act ― not as external objects as such, but 
rather as objects that are perceived and acted on.  
So what does this imply for the modelling human operators? This thesis presents 
arguments for modelling the operator by emphasising the aspects of the work domain that the 
operator can perceive. In other words, we should only include information that is available to 
the operator. This means that the extended user model must have a type of phenomenological 
validity that reflects the operator’s experience and perspective. It is of no use to include 
aspects of the technical system that are not available to the human operator (if it did it would 
not be called an operator model). The modelling of the technical system should on the other 
hand describe the objective situation, including aspects of the technical system that are not 
available to the operator in any sense (e.g. the actual physical state of effector systems, the 
internal workings of automation systems etc.) but that still can give insights into how the JCS 
perform.  
This thesis aims to contribute to the development of CSE research. I believe we can 
acknowledge the relationship between humans and technology that affects human work, 
without leaving the goal of the CSE-tradition. To the extent this thesis succeeds – it should be 
measured to how it would help us to understand and predict how whole human-technology 
systems create efficient, safe, sustainable and healthy human-technology systems.  
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 1. Introduction 
 
The modelling of complex sociotechnical systems that are subject to large operational and 
environmental variation is a complex task. In fact, researchers within the Human Factors 
discipline by and large agree that naturally occurring human behaviour in complex 
sosiotechnical systems is so variable that it cannot be predicted with any reliable accuracy 
(Hollnagel & Woods, 2005; Hollnagel, 1993; Burns & Hajdukiewicz, 2004). The alternative 
to exact predictions of operator behaviour is to focus on how human work performance is 
initiated by contextual circumstances (Hollnagel, 2005), or on categories of events that are 
found to be associated with the loss of control (e.g. Sarter & Woods, 1995, 1997; Woods & 
Hollnagel, 2006). The focus has in this sense shifted towards creating dynamic models that 
shows how a set of possible consequences may arise from a given set of probable causes. This 
modelling implies that we must use models that have an affinity to the time-dependent 
development of the sociotechnical system (Hollnagel, 2002).  
 
Hollnagel (1993) and Cacciabue (1996) have put forth three requirements that models of 
human-technology interaction must fulfil. The first requirement is the need for the model to 
reflect the system’s historical development, even though this is not directly observed at 
“present-state” observations. The second requirement is that one should not only describe the 
system as it is externally observed, but the model must also be able to describe “the model the 
user may have” (Hollnagel, 1993, p. 377). This suggests that the system model should 
somehow contain an abstraction that reflects the operator’s model of the whole system. We 
understand the notion of “the user’s model” in the sense that it should reflect an authentic 
phenomenological description of the operator’s perspective involving the relation between the 
user, the system and the environment (see Norros, 2004 for a similar approach). The third 
requirement stated by Hollnagel (1993) is that the system model should take into account the 
cooperation between multiple people and artefacts that constitute the context for control 
maintenance.  
 
Hollnagel (1993) and Cacciabue (1996) argues that modelling must account for all factors 
which play a significant role in the control of human-technology systems, and that specific 
models do so to the extent that these three modelling requirements are attended to. It is a 
particular challenge for dynamic operator models to show how human operators translate 
system variance into parameters in a way that allow effective control. This approach implies 
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 something quite different from the modelling of variance per se, as it aims to show how 
operators exploit the system’s ability to produce variance in order to reach system goals 
(Hollnagel & Woods, 2005). We have previously shown that the control situation framework 
(Petersen, 2004) can be used to make sense of joint system adaptation to unexpected changes 
in control requirements (Bjørkli et al., 2007). The following section shortly outlines the 
control situation framework as presented by Petersen (2002, 2004; Petersen & Nielsen, 2001) 
and Bjørkli, Øvergård, Røed, and Hoff (2007).  
 
1.1. The Control Situations Framework 
The control situation framework focuses on the operators’ ability to control system 
performance under variable conditions. It starts out with the notion of the control situation 
which can be described as the ability to use control possibilities in order to meet current and 
future control requirements. Control possibilities refer to the potential the joint system have 
for bringing about system state changes. For example, a ship’s ability to turn is dependent on 
both the design of the hull and rudder system and the given water flow. The ability of the 
marine navigator to initiate a turn is thus a function of the availability of relevant input 
devices (i.e. steering wheel) and of the effector system’s ability to bring about system state 
changes (Petersen, 2004; Petersen & Nielsen, 2001). Control requirements, on the other hand, 
can be described as “the requirements for bringing about appropriate state changes in the 
controlled system” (Petersen, 2004, p. 266). Control requirements are not formal descriptions 
of specific system states, but rather the formulation of the ability to bring about state changes 
that fits with the system’s goals as they are expressed in particular situations. This implies that 
the focus is on the operator’s ability to change system states and not on the system states as 
such (Bjørkli et al., 2007).  
 
The control situation framework further points to the operator’s ability to maintain the joint 
system within the acceptable action spaces, by adapting to control requirements in such a way 
that it satisfy both safe and efficient manoeuvring (Bjørkli et al., 2007). Acceptable action 
spaces refer first to the actualization of current control possibilities to meet control 
requirements, and second to the degree that the control actions effectuated at one point in time 
are coherent with the future maintenance of goal states. These two considerations can be 
described by the difference between the idealization and the optimalization of control. 
Manoeuvring in confined and demanding waters is a matter of adapting to the future control 
demands through the optimalization, rather than idealization, of control (Bjørkli et al., 2007). 
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 The idealization of control relates to the maintenance of a maximum distance from “here and 
now” dangers, which implies that the navigator chooses to always put the craft in the middle 
of the safe waters. This approach to navigation and manoeuvring is somewhat similar to 
Gibson and Crook’s (1938) “Field of Safe Travel” where it is presupposed that drivers 
attempt to “…keep the car headed into the middle of the field of safe travel” (Gibson & 
Crooks, 1938, p. 456, italics in original). The idealization of control entails that the operator 
keeps the maximum possible distance away from obstacles. Any manoeuvring that is based on 
the idealization of control will then relate mainly to the present and immediate terrain and 
control requirements.  
 
The optimalization of control, on the other hand, seeks to balance the demands and 
possibilities for control in order to achieve both safe and efficient movement. This implies 
that the transport system in question sometimes reduce its distance from dangers in order to 
obtain a position that improves the ability to navigate safely and efficiently in future 
trajectories. The system (e.g. a ship or a car) moves out from the centre of the field of safe 
travel and sometimes stray close to some obstacles in order to improve the conditions for 
future manoeuvring (e.g. the next turn). The optimalization of control mode is a clear example 
of how the joint system creates both the demands and the possibilities for control (Bjørkli et 
al., 2007).  
 
The control situation framework has been used to describe and explicate both particular work 
domains as well as theoretical modelling problems. The relevance of the control situations 
framework for the dynamic modelling of the system have up to today been related to the 
following aspects; a) description of actual control actions that was effectuated as adaptations 
to unanticipated events (Bjørkli et al., 2007), b) the description of the interdependence 
between effector systems and the operative environment (Petersen, 2004), and, c) pointing out 
that abstracted representations of means-end systems must include the physical realization of 
the means systems (Petersen & Nielsen, 2001). These articles show how the control situations 
framework can be used to cover the first and third of Hollnagel’s three requirements to 
dynamic models of man-machine interaction by showing how disturbance in system states are 
met by the interplay between operators, artefacts and effector systems (Bjørkli et al., 2007). 
However, there has been no discussion as to whether this framework can accommodate the 
operator’s model of the situation.  
 
94
 1.2.The aim of this article 
This article addresses the question whether it is possible to include the operator’s models of 
the system in the control situation framework. We have previously shown how the navigator’s 
adaptation to non-predicted disturbances or threats to system integrity is describable by the 
control situation framework (Bjørkli et al., 2007). The fact that observed operator behaviour 
can be categorized within a given conceptual or theoretical framework, however, does not 
entail that that framework is a good representation of the operator’s actual work. The focus of 
any conceptual framework or model must be to capture the underlying process that identifies 
the core of the phenomenon in question (see e.g. Norros, 2004). Thus, a model of human work 
domains must have authenticity, meaning that it must be based on actual and authentic 
observations of work practises (Woods, & Hollnagel, 2006). We will present transcriptions 
from verbal reflections made by military navigators during high-speed craft navigation and 
manoeuvring in complicated situations. The aim is to see how the operator’s models of the 
system are expressed in the verbal communication between the navigational crew.  
 
2. Method 
 
The basis for this study is the participation in, and observation of, different navigation teams 
during three naval exercises in the Norwegian Royal Navy in the period between 2003 and 
2005. Observational data was gathered by observation of the crew on the ship bridge engaged 
in navigation and manoeuvring of military High-Speed Crafts (HSC). All observations was 
videotaped by one stationary camera and one hand held camera. The stationary camera 
provided an overview over the ship bridge, and the handheld camera was directed at concrete 
actions of the crewmembers, as well as interface details. The two video streams were 
synchronized to provide multiple perspectives of the crew activities during performance. In 
total 120 hours of video was gathered in diverse operational settings over the project period 
2003 to late 2005.  
 
2.1. Hauk Class Vessels 
The Hauk-class vessels are a category of ships in use in the Norwegian Royal Navy for 
patrolling and operating in inshore waters. The Hauk class sails under the formal instruction 
of upholding national presence along the coastline of Norway in an efficient and safe manner. 
Safety is defined as the maintenance of the functional integrity of the ship and crew enabling 
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 a continuous ability to respond to orders given by the military authorities. Efficiency entails 
the ability to patrol large areas by holding high speeds while maintaining safety. The practical 
realization of these formal instructions involve that the crew and vessel must have the 
capacity to handle a wide range of maritime environments such as open or very confined 
waters, and to sail during any time of day/night and in any weather conditions. 
 
The Hauk vessels are categorised as fast patrol boats. The vessels is approximately 36,5 
meters with a beam of 6,5 meters, a displacement of 150 tonnes, and capable of operation 
speeds of approximately 32 knots (17 meters per second / 60 km/hour). The Hauk Class is 
specifically designed for keeping high speeds combined with maintaining good steering 
capacities – a combination crucial for operation in very narrow in-shore waters. Figure 1 
shows a Hauk class vessel. 
 
------------------------------------------- 
Please insert Figure 1 about here 
------------------------------------------ 
 
2.2. Crew Organisation 
Five persons of the total crew aboard are directly involved in the navigation. The navigator 
has the responsibility of safe and efficient operation of the ship. The navigator prepares the 
courses to sail before departure and executes this plan during operation. The plotter supports 
the navigator during operation by handling the chart and contributing to determination of ship 
position. The plotter exchanges information about navigation calculations with the navigator. 
The chart desk and plotter is placed behind the navigator. The helmsman steers the ship by 
using a wheel in accordance to verbally ordered courses by the navigator. The lookout is 
positioned at the top bridge outside the interior ship bridge and reports to the navigator what 
he visually observes in the environment that might be relevant for navigation safety. The last 
person directly involved in the ship navigation and manoeuvring is the commanding officer 
(CO) of the ship that bears the overall responsibility for the safety of the ship. The CO is 
responsible for solving the military and strategic tasks carried out. The commanding officer 
usually supervises the navigator when involved in the navigation. 
 
The individuals on the navigation team have their assigned workplace on the bridge as 
indicated in figure 2: 
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--------------------------------------------- 
Please insert Figure 2 about here 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
2.3. The Manoeuvring Capabilities of the Hauk Class  
The maneuvering capabilities of the Hauk-Class have been thoroughly described in previous 
publications (Bjørkli et al., 2007), but we will briefly outline the important aspects of the ship 
maneuvering capabilities.  
 
The Hauk-class uses a twin rudder system for maintenance and change of course. Course 
stability and change are effectuated through hydrodynamic principles that specify the 
interaction between the water flow along the hull and angle of the rudder. The water flow 
along the hull of a ship with symmetrical sides and the rudder amidships in calm waters refers 
to a symmetrical flow. Any athwartship forces exerted are balanced and reciprocally evened 
out. In this balance of longitudinal and athwartship forces, the ship maintains a straight-line 
course.  
 
In order to change course, the navigator changes the balance of forces and initiates a 
rotational movement. The rotational movement in a turn unfolds in three distinct phases. The 
first phase is initiated by the turning of the rudder. The change in rudder angle produces a 
minor lateral force that heels the ship slightly inward in the early phase of a turn. This 
movement results in a change in water flow in the bow, where the water now pushes more on 
one side of the hull. The second phase starts as the ship begins the rotational movement, 
where the ship heels outwards in the turn as this process is initiated immediate after the 
change of rudder angle. The third phase starts when the angular rotation speed is constant 
around the vertical axis in a steady turn where the lateral forces and the water flow acting on 
the bow are in balance. The rudder pushes the ship sideways into the water flow, resulting in 
the lateral force in a turn.  
 
The three phases making up a full turn of the Hauk-Class are initiated in a sequential process. 
The phases and their order of occurrence are determined by the relation between the 
hydrodynamic forces that act upon the hull and rudder system. These forces and the sequential 
nature of the turning phases are absolute physical constraints that the navigator must take into 
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 consideration when maneuvering in confined waters (Bjørkli et al., 2007; see also Petersen & 
Nielsen, 2001). Maneuvering in narrow passages becomes a challenging task since the three 
phases evolves in a non-linear fashion which is conditional upon unpredictable contextual 
variation such as waves, currents and wind. This means that the vessel’s actual turning 
capabilities can be highly variable. The main challenges are instantiated in the anticipation of 
the on-set and expression of each phase of a turn.  
 
3. Results: Observations and Transcriptions 
 
This article reports observational data obtained under two different series of events related to 
marine navigation and manoeuvring, respectively termed “The Kjøtta Incident” and the “Indre 
Folda Incidents” (Both named after the geographical name of the place where the incidents 
occurred). Each of these operational settings offered different challenges for the ship and 
crew. The main tasks related to different aspects of the relationship between navigation and 
manoeuvring necessary to sustain the joint system’s functional integrity.  
 
The Kjøtta Incident (paragraph 3.1.) refers to a critical event that occurred during a military 
exercise in November 2003 in the archipelago north of the Norwegian city Harstad. The event 
took place just outside the small island Kjøtta, and included an escalation of stress factors for 
the crew due to accumulated uncertainty in ship position, temporary crew structure, and 
technical malfunctioning.  
 
The second set of observations stems from video recordings of HSC operation in confined 
waters during a military exercise held at Indre Folda at the coast of Norway (paragraph 3.3). 
This is a region known for its demanding and confined waters, where the ship and crew are 
pushed towards the limits of their capabilities. Four verbal reflections made by the crew 
aboard the HSC taken from the Indre Folda navigation exercise are reported. 
  
3.1. The Kjøtta Incident: Navigating under uncertainty 
The incident took place on the 18th of November 2003, 01:13 AM under poor visual 
conditions with fog and occasional snow and rain showers. The time code in the transcript is 
relative to the recorded incident (00:00 to 16:30 minutes).  
 
98
 The ship was sailing a 6.15 nautical mile long course and steered into a 2.35 nautical mile 
long 0561 course between Grytøya and Kjøtta/Åkerøya. The 056 course was without any 
dangers such as underwater reefs or rocks. The course was still difficult to sail because it had 
few helpful contextual cues2 to facilitate the calculation and updating of ship position. The 
plotted course in the chart indicated the next course as a port turn into a 336 course through 
Sandssundet which is a rather narrow straight between Grytøya and Sandsøya. This straight 
had some dangers in the form of underwater rocks. The turn in the 336 course was intended to 
be initiated on cue by the visual contact with a known beacon. See figure 3 for a chart excerpt 
of Sandssundet with the relevant plotted courses. 
 
------------------------------------------------------ 
Please insert figure 3 about here 
------------------------------------------------------- 
 
The lack of contextual cues combined with darkness made the navigator aware that there was 
some uncertainty regarding the vessel’s actual position. The fact that they were about to enter 
confined waters made the uncertainty of the vessel’s position a possible critical threat to both 
safety and efficiency as they ran into the danger of grounding.  
 
In addition to the discovery of a deviation between estimated and actual position, the 
navigator discovered the presence of other unidentified vessels crossing the plotted trajectory. 
This clearly adds to the complexity of the situation as the navigator is forced to adapt the 
planned course to avoid conflicting courses with the other vessels nearby. Under normal 
conditions (good visibility during daytime and known ship position in less confined waters) 
this is a routine task that navigators often solve with ease. However, under the given 
circumstances, this event contributed to escalation of complexity to the situation.  
 
Time Agent Statement Action 
01:30 Lookout Vessel in green thirty!  
                                                 
1 Geographical direction of movement is denoted by a three-digit number between 000 and 359 where 000 
reflects true North. The numbers increases clockwise so a straight eastward movement is a 090 course, a 
southbound movement is 180 and straight westward course is 270. The course 059 reflects an East – Northeast 
movement.  
2 Marine navigation within the archipelago depend on the use of landmarks and other navigational aids such as 
beacons and iron perches that are placed to mark where it is possible to sail. Since it was midnight there was 
only possible to navigate by the use of beacons since pillars and landmarks were not visible in the darkness.  
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  Navigator Is it the SHV3 that lies out there (using binoculars to visually inspect 
the surroundings) 
 Navigator ”Ops – Bridge: Vessel in zero-
five-one, below fifty meters?” 
(using radio in communication with 
observation room below deck to 
request assistance to identify the 
observed vessel) 
 Lookout Incoming vessel in red five!  
 
Reduced visibility due to night-time, fog and snow made the observation of beacons and posts 
increasingly difficult. At this point in time, the CO was not on the ship bridge, as he attended 
military strategic tasks in the observation room below deck, leaving the navigator without 
additional on-bridge support in the navigation task.  
 
Time Agent Statement Action 
05:31 Obs4 Is it a lot of fog and snow outside 
now? 
(Communication over radio from the 
observation room below deck to the 
bridge) 
 Navigator Come again?  
 Obs Is it a lot of fog outside now?  
 Navigator Yes, there is some fog ...   
 Obs Roger  
 
Recurring intermittent alarms in the control panels of the ship controls informing of a 
malfunctioning port engine further complicated the situation. Procedure calls for establishing 
the criticality of the alarm by communication with engine room personnel, which in this case 
failed to respond to intercom calls from the navigator. 
 
Time Agent Statement Action 
06:59 Panel  (An alarm goes off, indicating, 
indicating critical malfunction in the 
port engine) 
 Navigator  (checks the alarm and the sound and 
stops) 
 Navigator Engine room – Bridge! (using radio and calling to the engine 
room from the bridge) 
 Navigator Engine room – Bridge! (calls the engine room again) 
                                                 
3 SHV = The Norwegian Maritime Civil Guard 
4 Obs = Observation room, a room below deck that among others contains advanced surveillance equipment.  
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The crew became increasingly occupied with the fact that they do not have the exact position 
of their vessel and the additional stress factors. The CO, currently situated in the observation 
room below deck, now ordered a reduction of speed as a remedy to the situation unfolding. 
 
Time Agent Statement Action 
08:00 CO Ops – Bridge The CO calls over the radio from the 
observation room below deck to the 
bridge 
 Navigator Bridge (Holding the radio and answering the 
call) 
 CO Now its time to reduce the speed  
 Navigator Yes, of course Navigator reduces speed by using the 
engine throttle 
 
The navigator was expecting to get visual contact with a navigational cue in the form a 
beacon at a particular point in time as predicted by the formal navigation plan. Visual contact 
with the beacon were planned to indicate a timely initiation of the turn to the 336 course. The 
visual contact was not made, and the navigator continued to visually inspect the environment 
with both binoculars and radar. The crew on the ship bridge engaged in visual search of the 
missing beacon. 
 
Time Agent Statement Action 
08:24 Navigator The beacon is not seen … Using binoculars while talking out 
loud) 
 Navigator Repeat course (speaking to the plotter) 
 Plotter Next course: three-three-six  
 Navigator Roger  
 
The situation was even more complicated due to a critical alarm on port side engine sounded 
for the second time, and the crew was still without visual contact with the beacon. In between 
handling alarms and trying to establish communication with the engine room, the beacon was 
spotted by the plotter approximately 30 seconds after they expected the beacon to appear. The 
navigator immediately initiated the turn into the 336 course.  
 
Time Agent Statement Action 
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 08:46 Navigator  (uses the radar) 
 Panel  (The alarm indicating critical engine 
malfunction is sounded for the second 
time) 
 Navigator  (leaves the radar and checks the 
alarm. The sound stops) 
 Navigator Call the engine room! (speaking to the plotter) 
 Plotter Roger  
 Navigator Port, three degrees (speaking to the helmsman) 
 Helmsman Port, three – Port three on! (confirming the order) 
 Plotter The beacon is seen!  
 Navigator Roger! Rudder amidships! (first speaking to the plotter, then 
giving rudder orders to the helmsman) 
 Helmsman Amidships – rudder amidships! (confirming the rudder order) 
 Navigator Roger, steady as she goes! (to the helmsman) 
 Helmsman One-five-zero, no, zero ... zero-
five-zero degrees! 
(first makes a reports a wrong course 
and then corrects himself and 
confirms the present course) 
 Navigator All good, helmsman  
 
Then several events occur at once. Right before the turn, and at the same time as the plotter 
starts to call the machine room, the navigator orders the plotter to update their position. The 
plotter quickly updates the log and then calls the machine room, and gives the phone to the 
navigator. However, they fail to get the exact position of the vessel. During the conversation 
the alarm sounds for the third time in less than three minutes. The alarm occurs only few 
seconds before the planned turning point for the next 336 course. At the same time the 
lookout spots a danger straight ahead.  
 
Time Agent Statement Action 
09:30 Plotter Hello ... the navigator wanted to 
talk to you 
(in communication with the machinist, 
then hands the phone to the 
navigator) 
 Navigator Yes, there’s a critical alarm on 
port engine going off all the 
time 
(in communication with the machinist 
while at the same using binoculars 
time to visually inspect the 
environment) 
 Panel  (The alarm indicating critical engine 
malfunction is sounded for the third 
102
 time) 
 Navigator Yes, come to three-three-six 
degrees 
(speaking on the phone while giving 
orders to the helmsman and handling 
the alarm) 
 Helmsman Coming to three-three-six 
degrees 
 
 Lookout (unclear)… vessel ahead  
 
The turn to the 336 course was eventually made while avoiding the other vessels in the 
proximity of the ship. The plotter and navigator entered a dialogue concerning the status of 
the 336 course by stating details on contextual dangers to be aware of, the length of the 
course, and the next course to steer. 
 
Time Agent Statement Action 
10:08 Helmsman Three-three-six on (confirming that the order is executed) 
 Navigator Roger.  
 Plotter There are no dangers in this 
course … some shallow waters 
on port side 
 
 Navigator Port side, right?   
 Plotter Zero-point-zero-five  
 Navigator What is the distance on this 
course? 
 
 Plotter One-point-eight  
 Navigator One-point-eight … we must then 
turn forty-five by the islet on port 
side 
 
 Navigator  (turns over to the chart table and 
discusses the chart with the plotter) 
 
The CO later enters the bridge and the navigator informs about the incident that occurred and 
that the last update exact ship position was somewhat uncertain. The navigator then orders the 
helmsman to change rudder control from hydraulic to electric, thus greatly increasing rudder 
gain.  
 
The uncertainty of the craft’s position endures and the navigator further reduces the speed. A 
little while later the craft’s engines are running idle and the craft moves at the slowest 
103
 possible speed up the straight between Grytøya and Sandsøya (approximately 5-8 knots). The 
navigator attempts to locate objects that can help update their current position and inform of 
the next turn point. This situation lasts for approximately one and a half minute. After a 
couple of minutes the next beacon is spotted and the navigator and the plotter can update the 
position with satisfactory accuracy. 
 
3.1.1. Aftermath 
We performed an unstructured interview with the navigator as soon as the ship entered port. 
The interview took place about three hours after the incident. The navigator stated that the 
ship had been off its plotted course by 2-3 cables on the 056 course (360-540 metres), and 
after the turn into the 336 course they started the work to update ship position with sufficient 
accuracy. Time pressure was considerably levered due to the speed reduction, which gave 
time to re-establish ship position.  
 
3.2. Discussion of the Kjøtta Incident: Critical Factors 
A key feature of the Kjøtta incident is the uncertainty concerning ship position that is 
expressed through the ‘non-appearing’ beacon. How did the uncertainty build up during the 
navigation? The ship had just before the described incident followed on the planned course 
and in accordance to navigation expectations. How did they loose their position? The 6.5 
nautical mile long course prior to the 056 course gives a clue. This course had few 
navigational objects that could assist in updating the position. The particularly long segment 
led to an accumulation of small errors in the vessel’s estimated position. Vessels always drift 
out of course due to currents and wind, and these disturbances accumulate if not corrected. 
Further, moderate inaccuracies in position determination are somewhat irrelevant in open 
water, but become critical when entering confined waters. In this case, the movement along 
the 056 course and the prior course had accumulated uncertainty, and this became explicit as 
the visual contact with the beacon cuing the turn to the next course was not made as planned. 
In addition to the omitted cue, the uncertain position becomes a direct threat to safety as 
contextual dangers approaches.  
 
The Kjøtta incident show how the navigator and plotter work to establish the formal demands 
to navigation, that is, to establish actual position. Not to know the craft’s position when 
navigating within the Norwegian archipelago implies that the control requirements are 
unknown, or at best highly uncertain. The crew is aware of their approximate position (give or 
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 take a couple of hundred meters), but the upcoming confined waters accentuate the need to 
establish their exact position. If the situation had escalated further and they completely lost 
their position the next control action would be to stop the craft completely. They would then 
establish their actual position by use of other means. This would be a response to the control 
requirements changing status from uncertain to unknown. Continuing to sail when the control 
requirements are unknown would be in direct conflict with their formal instructions of sailing 
in a safe manner.  
 
3.2.1. Uncertain demands and the ability to produce variance  
The crew handles the uncertainty of control requirements by increasing their ability to control 
the craft’s movements. The primary strategy in order to increase control is to reduce speed, 
which entails an increase in both the craft’s turn rate and the maximal functional rudder 
angle5. Maximal rudder angle is in an inverse relationship to the craft’s speed; hence maximal 
rudder angle (and then turn rate) will increase as speed decreases (Bjørkli et al., 2007). 
Reducing speed also means that the crew gains more time to establish ship position. Reducing 
speed thus also leads to reduction of the temporal demands on the work task (Hollnagel, 
2002).  
 
A second adaptation to the uncertainty of the situation is the shift from hydraulic to electric 
rudder control which leads to a large increase in the gain of the rudder control. This has 
several effects on the ability to bring about system state changes. Lowering the speed means 
that the craft reacts less to low rudder angles than at higher speeds. This problem can be 
counteracted by ensuring that the helmsman can activate a larger rudder angle in less time. 
Electric rudder control and lower speeds also allow for a larger turn rate which may come in 
handy if they need to quickly perform evasive manoeuvres to avoid grounding.  
 
 
Unpredictable variance in the environment is met by increasing the joint systems ability to 
bring about system state change and leveraging time. When the variance that must be met is 
uncertain or not known the crew maximizes the ability to bring about changes in system 
states. The adaptations allow for a more efficient handling of the possible dangers that may 
                                                 
5 Maximal rudder angle means that there is an upper limit to the amount of rudder angle that will lead to an 
increase in turn rate. If one increases turn rate beyond the maximum the vessel’s turn rate will not increase. 
Instead the vessel will begin to shake violently as the increased energy output from the rudder’s deflection of 
water is transformed. The navigators try not to exceed the maximal turn rate as this can damage the ship.  
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 appear due to the uncertainty of their position. Stated in the terms of the law of requisite 
variety (Hollnagel & Woods, 2005, Conant, 1969), the navigator and CO reduces speed and 
increases rudder gain in order to be able to produce system variance that are functionally 
adequate with respect to the unexpected or unknown variance in water depth. The Kjøtta 
incident is in this sense a real-life example of how human operators adapt to satisfy the law of 
requisite variety by anticipating future control requirements and altering the control 
possibilities.  
 
3.3. The Indre Folda reflections 
The reflections reported here occurred during a navigation exercise at Indre Folda region 
south of Rørvik in Norway. The observations were carried out during low tide at daytime in 
good visibility and weather conditions. The Indre Folda is a particularly demanding stretch 
with underwater reefs, shallow water, small islands and narrow passages. The low tide made 
the manoeuvring even more challenging by lowering the sea level and thus reducing the areas 
where the ship can travel without grounding. The demands on crew and vessel are even 
further enhanced by the fact that the ship manoeuvres the Indre Folda passage at top speed 
(approx. 32 knots). The navigation exercise that took place was a part of the Royal Norwegian 
Navy’s navigator training programme. The observed reflections are similar normal non-
training circumstances. This type of communication between navigator and CO is common 
during regular military exercises and operations and is considered part of normal operation.  
 
The chief acts both as a tutor for the navigator and as a conversational partner who gives 
advice and educated opinions on the navigator’s actions and choice of trajectories. The 
conversations of navigator and CO are constrained by continuously changing task demands. 
Often several formal and informal conversations are intertwined and concurrent (Andersen, 
2000). The dialogue between the CO and the navigator was also observed to occur 
simultaneously with other navigation and manoeuvring tasks. The navigator talked and 
listened to the chief while at the same time issuing rudder orders to the helmsman and asked 
the plotter for the next courses.  
 
The following sections present four verbal reflections where the navigator and the CO reflects 
upon the operation of the ship as they are faced with specific challenges during their journey 
through Indre Folda region.  
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 3.3.1. First reflection: Prospective adaptation to future challenges  
The first reflection between CO and navigator took place in a part of the Indre Folda where 
the ship had sailed earlier that day. The CO commented upon the positioning of the vessel and 
gave advice on the handling of the vessel in relation to contextual cues and future dangers. 
The issue at hand here was how to find a trajectory that allowed for both a good turn and that 
enabled the craft to pass both port and starboard dangers at a satisfactory distance. 
 
Time Agent Statement Action 
18:10 Navigator I think we’re in a better position 
now 
(referring to previous journey earlier 
the same day) 
 CO Yes, now you’re stemming 
towards the far iron perch  
(pointing to a set of perches in the 
upcoming waters) 
 Navigator … far perch …  
 CO Then you’ll get some space port 
side … and you’ll get an ideal 
trajectory 
 
 Navigator So, then I’ll get to the two-three-
four when … 
(making gestures indicating a 
starboard turn, and verbally referring 
to the next course which was 234) 
 CO Yes, then you’ll have a damn fine 
line through, right? … without 
you going in there and having to 
pull the ship through, and you’ll 
have a nice clearing to the 
dangers on starboard side, and 
to the dangers on the port side, 
when you get down there … and 
you have cleared the one on 
starboard. 
(making gestures indicating directions 
and turning movements while 
explaining.) (“… having to pull the 
ship thorough, …”, refers to a 
hypothetical turn in between the 
dangers) 
 
 
 
(“…the one on starboard.” refers to 
the dangers on starboard side) 
 
This reflection pointed to a situation where the crew attempted to optimize action space by 
manoeuvring in a way that satisfied both safety and efficiency concerns. The main problem 
faced here was the adaptation to particular circumstances by the use of contextual navigation 
cues to enable a safe passage between starboard and port dangers (as mentioned by the CO 
“and you’ll have a nice clearing to the dangers on starboard side, and to the dangers on the 
port side“). The navigator must furthermore take into account the sequential nature of the 
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 phases of the turn and their respective characteristics in order to adapt to the control 
requirements of the region. This last aspect is formulated by the CO’s comment on the need to 
maintain a straight course through without making a turn (“…without you going in there and 
having to pull the ship through…”). 
 
3.3.2. Second and third reflections: The initiation and timing of turns.  
The second and third reflection both involved the navigator and CO retrospectively discussing 
the use of rudder orders and manoeuvring strategies in two particularly difficult segments 
defined by many underwater reefs marked by iron perches. Both segments demanded many 
small and rapid corrections of the course in order to traverse safely. The second reflection 
reported herein occurred after they had passed the narrow entrance to the Indre Folda Region. 
The third reflection was observed after the sharp turn out from the infamous “Trail of 
Perches” which is a long and narrow passage among several sunken rock marked by perches.  
 
3.3.2.1. Second reflection – “The ’more than enough’ turn”  
The second reflection occurred in a short period of time where the workload was low and the 
CO and navigator talked about a rather narrow passage at the northern entrance of the Indre 
Folda region. This reflection is related to the problem of appropriate use of rudder angle to 
make small corrections in confined waters. The error margins in this area are small because of 
the closeness to sunken rocks and the momentum in the ships movement. Thus, any untimely 
or inappropriate rudder angle change that set the ship off the planned course are problematic 
since any lateral deviations from the safe course take time to correct.  
 
Time Agent Statement Action 
32:10 CO Yes, the use of rudder on the 
entrance to Indre Folda is a bit 
… 
(retrospectively commenting on a 
particularly demanding segment of 
the region they have just manoeuvred) 
 Navigator Come to port side five to two-
zero-zero degrees 
(to the helmsman) 
 Helmsman Two-zero-zero degrees (confirming order) 
 Navigator Yes, its more than enough down 
there, yes 
(to the CO, pointing to a particular 
turn inside entrance to The Indre 
Folda Region) 
 CO Yes, one or two degrees if you 
want to change the course, right, 
(discussing the use of rudder angles 
and timing to make the vessel turn 
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 rather than being too early by 
using two or three degrees, then 
the ship turns way too much 
appropriately in the given instance) 
 
Correcting a given course with only a few degrees in confined passages represents is 
challenging due to the manoeuvring properties of the Hauk-Class (see Bjørkli et al., 2007, for 
a thorough description of the Hauk-Class’ turning capabilities). The initiation of a turn is, as 
mentioned, implemented in three phases determined by interaction between hydrodynamics 
and the ship’s hull and rudder system. The initiation of the second phase initiates a rotational 
momentum which takes time to correct if the turn was too sharp. This has implications for the 
timing of the turn. If, on one hand, the ship comes too fast (meaning that the response to the 
rudder angle change is too large for the situation) or is initiated too early, the rotational 
momentum needs to be counteracted so that the ship does not collide with dangers on the 
inside of the turn. If, on the other hand, the turn comes too fast or is too small, the ship will 
turn too slowly to make it through the turn.  
 
3.3.2.2. Third reflection – “the six-thirteen turn”.  
The third reflection accentuates the observations made in the second reflection and involves 
the challenge of the balancing of timing and choice of rudder angle. The reflection is made 
retrospectively following the incident at the sharp port turn out of the “Trail of Perches” (the 
actual incident and the rudder orders given by the navigator is reported as “the Trail of 
Perches” in Bjørkli et al., 2007, p. 74 and 76). The navigator entered the turn by ordering a 
three degrees port rudder angle. The ship responded slowly and too little, so the navigator 
ordered a five degree port rudder angle. This was still not enough, so the navigator ended up 
increasing the rudder angle in rapid succession via seven degrees up to ten degrees as the ship 
entered and passed through the sharp port turn. The ship took a wide turn and got close to the 
sunken reefs and shallow waters. Immediately after the turn the CO responded to the late and 
gradual rudder orders, and pointed out ways to accommodate the craft’s turn rate. 
 
Time Agent Statement Action 
41:45 Navigator I got to induce more turn to open 
it up 
(Reflecting on the turn out from The 
Trail of Perches) 
 CO Yes, it a kind of ‘six-thirteen’ 
mentality 
(6-13 is a label of a torpedo used in 
the Norwegian Royal Navy – known 
for its limited steering abilities 
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 resulting in wide turns when changing 
course) 
 Navigator Six-thirteen mentality?  
 CO 
 
 
 
 
 
CO 
Yes, it is always turning wide, 
right, like you start with one 
degree, then two, then three, then 
four, then five and then all the 
way up to thousand.  
 
Its better to get the ship start 
turning, then adjust it as she goes 
(referring to the behaviour of the 6-13 
torpedo in a third-person perspective- 
as an analogy to the turn made by the 
navigator). 
 
 
(He then comments on a better 
strategy for handling these types of 
situations). 
 
The second and third reflections involve the same principle of adapting the ship turning 
characteristics to the particular situation. The challenge of manoeuvring in narrow passages is 
to use a rudder angle that initiates an acceptable rotational movement at an acceptable time.  
 
The importance of the timing and the ship’s response to the rudder angle get accentuated by 
comparing of the two reflections. The second reflection followed a situation where the 
navigator ordered three degrees rudder angle in order to make small adjustments to the craft’s 
course. This adjustment initiated a larger rotational movement than expected, and the 
rotational movement had to be counteracted to avoid a possible critical incident. The third 
reflection was related to the initiation of a small rudder angle which initiated a too small 
rotational movement too late. This lack of response had to be met by a continual increase of 
rudder angle in order to not run aground on a reef in front of the vessel. 
 
3.3.3. Fourth reflection: Navigating to improve manoeuvring 
The fourth reflection is a prospective planning of a situation where the craft comes from an 
open segment of the Indre Folda and is about to make a starboard turn into a narrow passage. 
The challenge in this situation is to find a good way to enter the narrow passage in a way 
where variability in lateral positioning in the sailable track is minimized when the ship enters 
the passage. The CO helps the navigator in this task by pointing out the presence of a mast 
that the navigator could stem towards.  
 
Time Agent Statement Action 
37:39 CO Do you see the mast down there? (pointing to the area in front of the 
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 ship) 
 Navigator The mast there …?  
 CO Stem towards that, and you’ll do 
just fine 
 
 Navigator Come port side to two-two-zero 
degrees 
(to the helmsman) 
 Helmsman Two-two-zero degrees (confirms rudder order) 
 CO (unclear) … to have the ship 
lined up straight as you go in, 
you got a straight line through, 
you not in a turn, (unclear)…you 
can go straight and then just dive 
into the turn 
(making gestures indicating directions 
in the waters ahead) 
 Navigator I never though of that  
 CO There you got it (referring to the current ship position 
and direction ) 
 Navigator Repeat next course (to the plotter) 
 Plotter Two-four-three (repeats next course) 
 CO You see that it eventually opens 
up, right? Just go head on. Set a 
course and go straight in. 
(making gestures indicating directions 
in the waters ahead) 
 
This segment before the narrow passage was deep and open enough to allow for a rather long 
and slow turn into the passage. The CO points out that the navigator does not have to make 
this long turn (which demands continuous supervision of the turn rate) and instead may stem 
towards a mast placed on the island. The mast was not part of the traditional navigational aids 
in Indre Folda. Stemming towards the mast allowed the navigator to make a fast and clean 
turn that gave time to align the craft into a straight course before entering the narrow passage. 
Figure 4 presents the possible difference between the two strategies the CO and the navigator 
intended to perform.  
 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
Please insert Figure 4 about here.  
------------------------------------------------------------- 
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 3.4. First and fourth reflections: Optimizing control 
The first and fourth reflection involves the prospective optimization of a turn so that the 
course through a narrow passage occurs in an acceptable manner. The optimizing of 
movement trajectory through the region demands that the crew takes into account the craft’s 
current position and movement dynamics and evaluate these factors up against future dangers 
and demands. This evaluation must also be made in accordance with the formal instructions of 
navigating safely and efficiently.  
 
The ability to optimize the situation show that the CO and the navigator have an explicit 
understanding of the craft’s movement dynamics in that they can prospectively evaluate the 
craft’s placement and movement some time into the future. The important finding here is not 
only that there is some type of optimalization going on, but rather that the navigator and CO 
seems to prospectively evaluate the pros and cons of the situation. They seem to adapt to the 
combination of control requirements and control possibilities as they choose the specific 
trajectories. It thus seems that the navigator and CO adapt their understanding of the current 
control situation as it unfolds (See also Bjørkli et al., 2007 for further examples).  
 
The fourth reflection from Indre Folda show how the CO combines local geographical 
knowledge with navigational expertise by using external aids to improve the craft’s trajectory 
into a narrow passage. The choice is between following a straight course and then to turn 
sharply into another straight course (the CO’s suggestion) through a narrow passage or to 
make a long gentle turn into the passage (the Navigator’s intention). The navigator’s choice of 
using a single long turn that is modulated as they approach the narrow passage leaves less 
time to straighten the craft’s course before they enter the narrow passage. The CO’s strategy, 
on the other hand, allow for more time to ensure a straight course through the passage since 
the turn is finished well before they enter the passage. The narrow passage does not allow for 
much deviation sideways positioning. Hence, it is better to complete the turn and adjust the 
craft’s position and heading well before they enter the narrow passage. Making a sharp turn 
which are cancelled out before they entered the passage is thus much less labour-intensive 
than entering the passage while still in a turn. Choosing to make many small corrections while 
entering the narrow passage (as the navigator intended) will increase the possible variance 
that must be handled.  
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 The issue at hand here is that one should make the adjustments to the ship’s course when one 
have the time and space for it. The navigator’s main challenge in such a situation is to find a 
good balance between the minimal numbers of corrections necessary to meet the control 
requirements that are present. The difference between the CO’s and Navigator’s control 
strategies is directly related to the reduction of lateral variance and handling of residual 
rotational momentum when entering the narrow passage.  
 
3.5. Second and third reflections: The timing of turns 
The second and third reflections are retrospective reflections involving the same underlying 
manoeuvring problem. It reflects the problem of setting the system up for action, rather than 
acting directly. This is done by the use of the turning strategy called “heating the turn6” in 
which the navigator initiates the rotational movement prior to making the actual turn. This is 
done by activating small rudder angles which starts first phase of the turn without initiating 
the second phase consisting of the rotational movement. This is a form of preparation of the 
system for upcoming course changes. The basis for this is the phased initiation of rotation that 
is due to the non-symmetric hydrodynamic forces acting on the hull and rudder.  
 
The advantage of this strategy is that rudder angle increments in the same direction have a 
faster effect on the craft’s turn rate after the vessel has started the rotational initiation. This 
improves the predictability of the vessel’s movement and turn rate since it reduces the 
temporal lag between initiation of rudder angles and the actualization of the rotational 
movement.  
 
The problem in the second reflection was the over-initiation of the turn rate using three 
degrees, rather than one or two. This led to quick and sharp turn which had to be corrected to 
keep the vessel on the safe path between the shallow rocks. It is this effect the CO refers to 
when he states “… rather that than being too early by using two or three degrees, then the 
ship turns way too much”. The problem in the third reflection is ordering too little rudder 
angle in the beginning of the turn, which means that the boat takes more time to initiate the 
rotational movement. When this rotational movement comes it was too small, thus increasing 
the demand for further rudder angle in order to not ground on dangers ahead. The challenge in 
                                                 
6 The Norwegian term is “varme tørnet” which is directly translated to “heating the turn”, indicating that one 
prepares the system to act in given manner which will not require any additional time lag or additional actions on 
the side of the navigator.  
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 both these reflections is to find the shifting point between turning and non-turning, between 
the initiation of the first and the second phase.  
 
The relationship between first and fourth reflections versus second and third reflections is that 
the use of external contextual aids and local knowledge in order to optimize the movement 
through the area depend on explicit knowledge of the vessels steering capabilities and turning 
dynamics. The second and third reflections give us an insight into how the navigator and chief 
judges the situations they encounter in terms of the steering capabilities of the joint system.  
 
4. General Discussion 
 
What do the present observations tell us about the operator’s strategies and their models or 
understanding of the situation? The aim of this article is to find whether the control situation 
framework (Petersen, 2004; Bjørkli et al., 2007) contains a description of the models the users 
have of themselves and the technical system, thus fulfilling Hollnagel’s second requirement to 
dynamic models of human-technology systems (Hollnagel, 1993).  
 
4.1. The navigator’s control strategy: Reduce control demands on short time-scales. 
The comparison between the Kjøtta incident and the two sets of reflections in Indre Folda 
show that the relative importance of navigation (e.g. knowing the ship’s position, knowing 
next course, keeping to planned route) and manoeuvring (e.g. steering the ship according to 
next courses, maintain satisfactory distance to dangers, adapting current course and position 
to improve future manoeuvring).  
 
In the Kjøtta incident the navigators are met by a complex navigational task where the 
demands for manoeuvring are low (straight long courses few immediate dangers). The 
uncertainty of the ship’s position makes the crew adapt to the situation by maximizing their 
control possibilities and, at the same time, reducing the control demands. These adaptations 
could be described as preparing for efficient control actions on shorter time-scales without 
needing to alter system parameters (e.g. reducing speed or altering rudder gain) before they 
initiate evasive manoeuvres. When control demands are highly uncertain, the crew prepares 
the ship for maximum state change. Thus, the crew adapts by prospectively altering the 
control possibilities over the craft’s movement (lower speed, increasing gain of rudder 
controller) that ensures a functional adequacy related to a set of possible but uncertain control 
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 requirements. By reducing speed, they also lower the prospective control requirements, by 
getting more time to perform control actions.  
 
The passage through Indre Folda, on the other hand, involves a larger focus on manoeuvring 
and less on navigation as such. Control requirements are more related to manoeuvring to 
avoid sunken rocks and to maintain a good position for future manoeuvring. Hence, control 
actions in the Indre Folda reflections are more subject to time pressure (i.e. must occur on 
shorter time-scales), but the control requirements are quite clear and explicit. 
 
In the first and fourth reflection the crew is faced with a task that involves both navigation and 
manoeuvring. The crew must use contextual cues to navigate in order to optimize the 
possibility for manoeuvring through narrow passages. The movement from rather open waters 
to confined waters is a challenge that relates not only to navigation, but also to the 
manoeuvring and reduction of lateral trajectory variance through the region. The first and 
fourth reflection gives us an insight in the on-line planning that the crew performs before 
entering confined areas where manoeuvring is a primary task. By using both local 
geographical knowledge and knowledge of the vessel’s movement capabilities the crew 
adapts to particular demands by reducing variance on short time-scales. The reduction of 
variance and uncertainty on shorter time-scales also increases predictability of the ship’s 
trajectory, and henceforth reduces the need for feedback-controlled adaptations that must be 
initiated quickly.  
 
In the second and third reflections the crew is faced with difficult manoeuvring where the 
time-frame for performing the next control action is in the time-range of split-seconds to 
seconds. In order to be better able to adapt to the situation the navigators uses a strategy called 
“heating the turn” by initiating a small rotational movement in the vessel before the actual 
turn is supposed to be performed. This increases the ship’s responsiveness to further rudder 
angels in the same direction as the initiated turn. The strategy has adaptive interest as the 
increased responsiveness and reduced time lag between rudder angle changes and initiation of 
turn increases the predictability of the turn. The strategy also allows for faster feedback on 
modulations so that further changes can be made.  
 
The layout of the environment in combination with the task requirements involves different 
time-frames for adaptation (Hollnagel, 2002) and affects which control task (navigation 
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 versus manoeuvring) are the most pressing (Hollnagel, 1993; Hollnagel & Woods, 2005). The 
difference in control tasks and time-scales for control actions are, despite the difference in 
time-frames and context for operation, similar in structure. The three observations all show 
how operators control the system in ways that eases the maintenance of control on shorter 
time-scales. They do this by either maximizing the ability to react to uncertain and possible 
imminent critical situation (the Kjøtta incident), by reducing the environmental variance 
related to their manoeuvring (the first and fourth reflection in Indre Folda), or by preparing 
the system for upcoming turns (by ‘heating the turn’ in the second and third reflections in 
Indre Folda). These observations can be described at a general level as the reduction of 
unintended variance on short time-scales. This argument may be seen to reverberate 
Bernstein’s (1967) understanding of how coordination is achieved – by reducing the number 
of independent variables that need to be controlled. Rasmussen (1990) points out a similar 
view on coordination in complex sociotechnical systems. He argues that workers often spend 
as much time to assess the number of degrees of freedom and the significance of them as 
actually responding the system performance. In this sense, modern complex systems represent 
the challenge of problem formulation and diagnostics as well as problem solving and operator 
intervention, and the integration of those two are at the heart of skilled work practice. 
 
The control strategies observed in the Indre Folda reflections and the Kjøtta incident are tied 
up to the physical and temporal constraints for the ship’s steering capabilities. All control 
actions that have to be performed on short time-scales must be based upon the nature of the 
ship’s turning characteristics. Effective control demands that the crew take into account the 
specific sequential unfolding of the ship’s turning characteristics and the uncertainties that are 
related to this dynamic process. The navigators must adhere to the physical constraints of their 
work domain (see e.g. Vicente, 1999, for a discussion).  
 
4.2. What models do experienced navigators use? 
The knowledge of the control strategies used by experienced navigators give insights into the 
models or understanding the navigator have of the situation. Adaptations made to maintain 
control in a navigational task is exemplified by the Kjøtta Incident which shows that 
experienced navigators are sensitive to any significant changes in the contextual variance. 
They furthermore adapt to the increased uncertainty of future contextual variance by 
increasing their ability to control the craft’s movement. This joint adaptation to altered control 
requirements (uncertainty of position of underwater reefs and rocks) through the increase of 
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 control possibilities (turn rate, time constraints) is an example of adaptations to possible 
future control situations. The navigator does not reduce speed due to dangers that are present 
“here-and-now” but rather because the uncertainty of the situation demands that he must 
maximize the ability to meet future dangers. The observations of the Kjøtta incident indicate 
that the navigator adapts prospectively to the joint set of control requirements and control 
possibilities, thus indicating that the navigator’s model of the system is tied to the system’s 
particularized control situation as it is expressed in the contextual requirements for control 
and the specific control possibilities.  
 
The strategies of preparing the joint system for control actions made on short time scales can 
be understood as a function of the navigators’ model of the situation and the situation in itself: 
Firstly, high speed craft manoeuvring is first and foremost guided by the constraints set by the 
immediate environment. The environmental constraints also directly affect the time 
constraints that navigators have to perform control actions. Secondly, the capability of the 
craft’s effector systems to bring about system state changes is conditional upon other 
contextual factors such as wind, currents and waves (Petersen & Nielsen, 2001; see also von 
Wright, 1971, p. 66ff). These contextual factors are not readily perceived by the human 
operator and thus create uncertainty of the actual capability of the craft’s effector systems. By 
reducing the need to make quick adaptations on shorter time scales the operators give 
themselves more time to deal with unanticipated changes in the craft’s movement dynamics. 
The short available time to perform corrective actions is not only a problem for the navigator, 
but it may also lead the joint system too close to its operative boundaries, thus creating a 
possible critical incident. Thirdly, by adapting to particular circumstances by reducing the 
workload on shorter time scales the navigators can effectively reduce the need to make many 
small adjustments to the craft’s movement trajectory, thereby also reducing the degrees of 
freedom that need to be controlled.  
 
Both in the prospective and retrospective reflections made in Indre Folda the navigator and 
CO discusses actively how to manoeuvre in difficult confined waters. The results indicate that 
experienced navigators perceive the situation in terms of the possibilities and constraints for 
action. In other words; experienced operators perceive the affordances and constraints for not 
only their own actions, but also for the joint human-technology system. This possibility is 
supported by experimental evidence that indicate that experienced drivers of a wide range of 
vehicles in some way extends the perception of passable apertures to also cover the vehicle 
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 that they control (see Shaw, Flascher & Kadar, 1995, for a theoretical and empirical review). 
This close connection between experienced operator’s and their work domains has been 
empirically noted before, particularly in supervisory process control (metal manufacturing 
industry; Norros, 2004) where the physical separation of operator’s and technology are more 
clear-cut than in the case of marine high-speed craft manoeuvring.  
 
Operators can in this sense be understood not only as initiators of effector systems, but also as 
extended operators that include system dynamics in the perception of action possibilities and 
constraints (Øvergård et al., 2008; Øvergård & Hoff, 2005). In this situation, the operator 
must have an understanding of the expected variability of the craft’s movement capabilities as 
it is actualized in particular settings (see Bjørkli et al., 2007). The uncertain nature of high-
speed craft manoeuvring capabilities indicate that the operator does not use a model of the 
turning capabilities of the vessel as a formalized description of the ship’s effector systems, but 
rather as a set of possible realizations of the initiation of a given et of rudder angles.  
 
5. Conclusion 
 
The observations and the navigating crew’s reflections indicated that the control situation may 
be a possible way of modelling the operators understanding of the controlled system.  
 
The concepts of control possibilities and control requirements reflect basic parts of the 
navigators’ control strategies and models of the work domain. The navigating crew’s 
strategies and verbalizations indicated that they explicitly balanced control possibilities up 
against control requirements. The reflections at Indre Folda also indicated that these strategies 
were guided by an explicit knowledge of the how the physical and temporal dynamics were 
actualized in manoeuvring. This element was particularly expressed in the observation of the 
strategy called “heating the turn”. This does not mean that the navigators used a formalized 
specification of the characteristics of the effector systems as such (which would be useless 
due to unpredictable contextual variance). The navigators’ model is rather based on the 
functional expression of the interaction between hydrodynamics and effector systems. The 
nature of the physically constrained (but unpredictable) functional expression was taken into 
account by the navigators by the observation that they acted as to reduce unpredictable 
variance on short time-scales.  
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The observations and reflections of actual work performance indicate that the main concepts 
in the control situation framework can be used to reflect the operator’s models as used in 
authentic work situations, thus fulfilling Hollnagel’s (1993) second requirement to dynamic 
models of human-technology systems.  
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 Figures 
Figure 1: The Hauk-Class vessel 
 
 
 
Figure 2: The navigation team’s workplaces at the ship’s bridge. 
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Figure 3: Map over Sandssundet 
 
 
Figure 4: Control strategies in the fourth reflection 
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 Figure captions 
 
Figure 1: Fast patrol boat of Hauk-class during exercises in November 2004. Photo by C. A. 
Bjørkli.  
 
Figure 2: Left: Overview of the bridge. The ship’s bow is up. The figure indicates the 
positioning of the five crew members involved in navigation and manoeuvring.  
 
Figure 3: Map overview over Sandssundet. The black lines show the approximate planned 
courses. The ship came into the map on a 056 course heading N-NW. The crew had planned 
to make the turn into the 336 course heading N-NE when the beacon shifted from green to 
white. Map excerpt fra sea map no. 80 reproduced with permission no. 591/08 from Statens 
Kartverk Sjø.  
 
Figure 4: Presentation of the hypothetical trajectories following the strategies used by the CO 
and the Navigator. The dotted line represents the Navigator’s strategy, while the whole line 
representing the sharp turn represents the CO’s strategy. The difference between these 
strategies can be seen as the difference between the lines named Sit-N and Sit-co which show 
the space available for modulations of the craft’s trajectory into the narrow passage. The CO’s 
strategy allow for more time to adjust the craft’s course, and hence is more robust when it 
comes to adapting lateral variance before and during the trajectory through the narrow 
passage.  
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